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Introduction
By the end of 2013, private households worldwide held nancial assets worth about US $8
trillion in o¤shore nancial centers, where strict banking secrecy laws and other opaque
regulations help to conceal information on who owns these funds and what income they
generate.1 This secretive environment induces many owners of o¤shore accounts to evade
taxation in their home countries, which earned such nancial centers the name of tax
havens.2 The associated evasion is estimated to reduce government revenues worldwide
by around US $200 billion every year (Zucman 2014, p. 141f).
Given the sizeable losses in tax revenues, recent years have witnessed a variety of
initiatives at the highest levels of national and international politics in an attempt to
ght o¤shore tax evasion. Among others, these have included reduced penalties for tax
evaders who voluntarily disclose their o¤shore assets, 3 an anonymous withholding tax on
interest income of non-residents,4 acquisitions of stolen customer les from banks in tax
havens,5 criminal prosecutions of nancial institutions assisting with o¤shore tax evasion, 6
1Zucman (2014, p. 139) estimates the private nancial wealth held o¤shore by the end of 2013 at US $7.6 trillion or,
equivalently, at 8% of the global private nancial wealth. The Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 2014, p. 9f) puts that
number at US $8.9 trillion.
2For example, Zucman (2014, online appendix) estimates that, by the end of 2013, 80% of the European-owned funds
in Switzerland were not taxed. A report by the US Senate (2014, p. 61) estimates that, until 2008, between 85 to 95% of
the US-linked accounts with Credit Suisse in Switzerland had been undeclared to US authorities.
3For an overview of voluntary disclosure programs in OECD countries and a study on how they a¤ect o¤shore tax
evasion and tax revenues net of administrative costs, see Langenmayr (2015).
4Since 2005 pursuant to the European Savings Directive, EU and participating third countries provide mutual assistance
in taxing their residents interest incomes derived in countries other than the respective residence country. The countries
either exchange information on that income or impose an anonymous withholding tax and pass on most of the tax revenue
to the residence country. For more information on the Savings Directive and an analysis of its impact on deposits in
Switzerland, see Johannesen (2014).
5 In 2006, for the rst time, German tax authorities acquired stolen banking data to identify the owners of secret accounts
at LGT Bank in Liechtenstein. The data was extracted by a former computer technician at the bank, Heinrich Kieber. Many
more similar data leaks were to come, which were acquired by Germany and also other countries. For more information
and an analysis of how such leaks a¤ected o¤shore tax evasion, see Chapter 2.
6Most prominently, starting in 2007, the US Department of Justice prosecuted UBS, Credit Suisse, and further predom-
inantly Swiss banks as part of its O¤shore Compliance Initiative. See https://www.justice.gov/tax/o¤shore-compliance-
initiative (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
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a program to resolve the potential criminal liability of tax haven banks which disclose their
cross-border activities,7 and new international agreements on the exchange of nancial
account information for tax purposes on request 8 as well as automatically.9 The level
of tax compliance in o¤shore nancial centers increased throughout these initiatives, but
empirical evidence suggests that it remains on a low level.10
This dissertation addresses the optimal design of policies to ght o¤shore tax evasion.
In the rst chapter, it studies the strategic interactions of the decisions of a haven country
whether to operate as a secretive tax haven or to comply with international standards of
transparency and of many individual investors whether to be tax compliant or to conceal
wealth in this country. It also analyzes how these decisions are inuenced by external
policy parameters. In the subsequent two chapters, the dissertation provides empirical
evidence examining the e¤ects of two recent policy initiatives in the ght against o¤shore
tax evasion the automatic exchange of nancial account information and the acquisitions
of stolen customer les from banks in tax havens.
Chapter 1 studies the compliance decisions of a haven country and its potential in-
vestors. For the haven country, operating a secrecy regime comes at the cost of interna-
tional pressure imposed by high-tax countries. On the other hand, operating a secrecy
regime also generates benets as it can attract large amounts of international capital,
which creates private gains in the nancial sector that manages the attracted wealth and
ultimately also generates tax revenues. The benets from being a tax haven are larger if
more wealth is attracted by the secrecy regime. The amount of capital deposited in the
haven country depends, in turn, on the decisions of many individual investors. For them,
concealing funds in the tax haven has the advantage of bypassing taxation in their home
countries, but may trigger severe penalties if the tax evasion is exposed should the haven
country choose to cooperate and exchange information with foreign tax authorities.
The analysis identies the decisions of a haven country and the set of its potential
investors as well as the decisions of the many individual investors to be strategic com-
plements. These complementarities create a coordination problem and support multiple
equilibria  a successful coordination may have large amounts of wealth held o¤shore,
which makes the tax haven regime protable and resilient against international pressure,
and induces each investor to conceal capital in the haven country; while a coordination
failure may cause no or small o¤shore deposits, tax transparency, and no evasion. Whether
7After several Swiss banks had been investigated individually, the US Department of Justice announced the Swiss
Bank Program in 2013. It allowed Swiss banks not already under investigation to resolve their potential criminal
liability if, among others, they fully disclosed their US cross-border activities and paid appropriate penalties. See
https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
8At their summit in April 2009, the G20 countries strongarmed all haven countries to adopt an exchange of information
for tax purposes in cases with reasonable grounds to suspect tax non-compliance. For more information on the information
exchange on request and a study on its impact on deposits in tax havens, see Johannesen and Zucman (2014).
9Financial account information is automatically provided to the US under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) as amended in 2010 and to other countries under the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters as
amended in 2014. For more information on the latter and an analysis how it a¤ected o¤shore tax evasion, see Chapter 3.
10Johannesen and Zucman (2014, p. 87¤) and Zucman (2014, online appendix) report that the compliance rate among
European holders of Swiss bank accounts has increased since 2006, but remains low at around 20%.
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or not the ght against tax havens will be successful is determined in a many-player co-
ordination game.
In order to assess which coordination outcome will prevail, the study applies a stan-
dard equilibrium selection argument from the global games literature. The equilibrium
selection reects the informational setting in the environment of o¤shore tax evasion and
derives a unique outcome prediction depending on the amount of international pressure
on tax havens. A haven country and its potential investors will coordinate on an active
tax haven business if and only if the international pressure creates costs below an equi-
librium threshold. If the pressure exceeds that threshold, the equilibrium predicts tax
transparency and no evasion. Notably, the cost threshold is smaller than the potential
earnings from the tax haven business. Above the threshold, a tax haven business would
need to attract large amounts of wealth to still be protable, which makes it considerably
risky for each individual investor to conceal capital therein. Therefore, in equilibrium,
every investor abstains from o¤shore tax evasion and the haven country complies with
international standards of transparency. That is, su¢ ciently strong international pressure
will induce tax transparency even though the costs it generates may still be small relative
to the gains of a tax haven.
Furthermore, the equilibrium cost threshold depends on several policy parameters,
which has implications as to which conditions facilitate and which conditions impede
a coordination failure for more tax transparency. For example, the analysis points out
a trade-o¤ between the ght against tax havens and a high level of taxation, as high
taxes give investors a strong incentive to evade taxation. For a similar reason, tax havens
can withstand erce pressure if the penalties for revealed o¤shore tax evasion are low.
Finally, the tax haven business is most robust if the fees for concealment services in the
haven country are priced below the tax rate in high-tax countries to attract investors,
but also larger than zero to make the haven country resilient against political pressure
from abroad. This may explain why the prots of tax havens are not competed away in
international nancial markets. 11
The following two chapters provide empirical evidence on the e¤ects of two recent policy
initiatives against o¤shore tax evasion. As the concealment activities make it inherently
di¢ cult to observe tax evasion, the analyses rely on an indirect measure of tax evasion
they apply standard event studies to identify abnormal returns in the stock prices of
Swiss banks. They have been subject to strict banking secrecy regulations and many of
them were identied by the US Department of Justice to have assisted foreign clients
with o¤shore tax evasion. These banks have attracted many international customers, the
majority of whom are suspected to evade taxation, and the service and transaction fees
from managing their wealth enter into the banks prots. 12 The underlying reason to
11The summary of Chapter 1 may in parts resemble Konrad and Stolper (2016b), which also summarizes the chapter.
12Zucman (2014, Table S.1 and online appendix) estimates the foreign-owned wealth held in Switzerland by the end of
2013 at US $2.4 trillion, of which he suspects 80% were not taxed.
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study stock prices is that they reect the net present value of expected future prots. If a
new policy initiative reduces the extent of o¤shore tax evasion, this will also most likely
reduce the market for evasion-related banking services, and be immediately reected by
a decrease in the banksstock prices.
Chapter 2 addresses incidents when foreign tax authorities acquired stolen customer
les from (former) employees of banks in tax havens, or when such information was leaked
to public media. The rst data leak of this kind occurred at LGT Bank in Liechtenstein
and reached public awareness on 14 February 2008 when the premises of Klaus Zumwinkel,
at that time chief executive of Deutsche Post, were raided on charges of tax evasion. The
leak caused a signicant drop in the stock prices of Swiss banks with a known link to
o¤shore tax evasion. The drop varied systematically across the banks and was as large as
6% for those banks most strongly involved with foreign tax evaders. Other Swiss banks
with no identied link to o¤shore tax evasion experienced no such reduction in their
market values. The study also reports weak signs of negative stock market responses to
subsequent data leaks, but the e¤ects were relatively modest in size and typically not
statistically signicant at conventional levels.
The results suggest that nancial markets expected the data leak from LGT Bank
to reduce the future prots of Swiss banks. As tax evasion in haven banks had never
previously been exposed by data leaks, the most plausible interpretation is that the
rst leak increased the perceived risk of involuntary exposure and contracted the market
for tax non-compliant banking services. Subsequent data leaks seemingly induced no
more signicant updating of the beliefs about the detection risk. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that the deterrence e¤ect of the rst leak might have reduced the
hidden wealth in Switzerland by around 10%. Moreover, this drop in the amount of
o¤shore wealth in Swiss banks is also supported in international investment statistics by
the Bank for International Settlements on foreign-owned bank deposits in all tax havens.
Furthermore, this study is the rst to provide empirical support that whistleblowing
can deter criminal behavior. Whistleblowing has become increasingly important and, for
example, is reported to be the prime mechanism to detect corporate fraud.13 Therefore,
implications of the results may extend beyond the application of o¤shore tax evasion.
Chapter 3 addresses the automatic exchange of nancial account information. For
decades, the Swiss banking secrecy was renowned for concealing information on who owns
the wealth in Swiss banks and what income they generate from it. As of 2018, Switzerland
will exchange information about its banksforeign customers and their nancial accounts
with the respective home countries on an automatic basis.14 The analysis tracks the tran-
sition from banking secrecy into tax transparency by systematically searching the front
13A survey by the Association of Certied Fraud Examiners nds that around 40% of the detected corporate fraud
causes were identied based on tips from whistleblowers. See Corporate crime: The age of whistleblower, The Economist,
5 December 2015.
14The analysis studies the automatic exchange of information pursuant to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Tax Matters as developed by the OECD and which, by the time of writing, more than 100 countries had committed to
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pages of a leading Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Any major change to the
banking secrecy that has the potential to systematically a¤ect the banksstock prices is
expected to be reported on the front pages of Swiss newspapers. The main focus of the
study is the date when Switzerland committed to implement the new information ex-
change. Furthermore, it also addresses a set of events that can be considered particularly
important and might have changed nancial markets expectations. None of the events
triggered signicant or sizeable responses in the stock prices of Swiss banks, neither in
the full sample nor for the banks most strongly involved in o¤shore tax evasion. The
minimum detectable e¤ect sizes are moderately sized and well below the estimates for
the data leak from LGT Bank. This suggests that the null results are not a consequence
of low statistical power, but rather due to a lack of e¤ect. Finally, the study estimates
the stock price reactions of Swiss banks to every front page article mentioning the auto-
matic exchange of information. Only two articles were followed by a sizeable abnormal
drop in the stock prices. However, the exact timing of the decline in stock prices and the
similarity to the abnormal performance of the Swiss Market Index, a major index for the
entire Swiss stock market, suggest that the stock price drops might have been driven by
factors other than the new tax transparency.
The results are suggestive that nancial markets expected the automatic exchange of
nancial account information to have no signicant impact on Swiss banksfuture prots.
While it is possible that previously tax non-compliant accounts became compliant and
remained with the banks, it seems unlikely that a signicant increase in the level of tax
compliance would have no impact on the banksfuture earnings. A more plausible expla-
nation for the results is that the new transparency standard might not have signicantly
increased tax compliance among the owners of o¤shore accounts. In fact, loopholes in the
new information exchange, which allow tax evaders to keep their wealth with Swiss banks
and still remain anonymous to their home tax authorities, already feature prominently
in the media and are said to have attracted large sums of capital.15
implement. The US exchanges nancial account information on an automatic basis pursuant to the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act, which is not a subject of the analysis.
15One such loophole that is said to have attracted large amounts of capital is described in Financial transparency: The
biggest loophole of all, The Economist, 20 February 2016.
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1Coordination and the ght against tax havens
This chapter is based on joint work with Kai A. Konrad.1
1.1 Introduction
O¤shore tax evasion poses a serious challenge to countries all over the world. Zucman
(2013) estimates that households hold nancial assets worth US $5.9 trillion through tax
havens, or equivalently 8% of their global net nancial wealth, most of which is believed
to go unrecorded.2 Various countries and supranational organizations, such as the OECD,
have launched several initiatives against tax havens, e¤ectively making it more costly for
a country or jurisdiction to o¤er tax sheltering opportunities. This process, sometimes
referred to as the ght against tax havens , has partially succeeded. Some countries chose
to become compliant and have abandoned their tax sheltering practices, while others have
resisted and remain active as tax havens. For observers it is di¢ cult to understand why
and when haven countries change their attitudes.
With regard to tax evasion by private investors, the term tax haven is primarily used
for countries with no or only nominal taxation and strict secrecy rules that enable foreign
investors to conceal capital and capital income from the tax authorities in their respective
home countries.3 As one of the most prominent players, the OECD strives for an inter-
1See Konrad and Stolper (2016).
2The total wealth hidden in tax havens is likely to be even higher because Zucmans (2013) estimate does not include
non-nancial wealth, such as art or real estate, and accounts for the year 2008 when global stock markets were low. A
detailed industry report estimates the private o¤shore wealth for the same year at US $6.7 trillion (The Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) 2009, p. 30). The corresponding estimate for 2015 is US $9.8 trillion (The Boston Consulting Group (BCG)
2016, p. 11).
3The OECD report on harmful tax competition (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
1998, pp. 2125) presents a number of factors to identify tax havens. One of these are no or only nominal taxes combined
with laws or administrative practices that prevent an e¤ective exchange of information for tax purposes.
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national exchange of tax information and exerts political pressure on all non-cooperative
jurisdictions. The pressure has included blacklisting and the threat of economic sanctions,
and peaked at the G20 summit in April 2009.4 In response, many haven countries agreed
to an exchange of tax information on request. Other haven countries, however, either
refused to enter such treaties, or signed them but did not implement them e¤ectively. 5
A thorough understanding of why and when a haven country adapts to the international
standard of transparency, and when it does not, is important for taking the next steps to
an e¤ective automatic exchange of tax information.
This chapter develops an equilibrium framework for the decision of a haven country as
to whether to operate as a tax haven or to adopt a transparency regime. In our formal
framework, a single haven country may provide a secrecy regime in which investors can
hide otherwise taxable capital from their respective residence countries. The investors
decide individually whether to use the concealment opportunity or to face full taxation
in their residence country. A capital-concealing investor must pay a fee for the wealth
management in the tax haven, and the haven country benets from this economic activity,
e.g. by taxing the nancial sector. Even though the fee and the government revenue are
related more indirectly (see Schoen 2005) we treat them as equal in size. For each investor,
the fee may be a small percentage of the funds sheltered but, given the large sums of
capital that can be concealed by a haven country, even very small fees can add up to large
earnings and can make the tax haven business very attractive. However, the provision of
a secrecy regime creates not only benets but also some political cost. It originates from
international pressure that involves economic sanctions, forgone benecial treaties or the
potential loss in business reputation for being blacklisted as a tax haven. While most of
our analysis focuses on a single haven country, we also discuss competition between haven
countries and the robustness of our results to the presence of multiple tax havens.
We focus on the role of coordination among individual investors, and the role of coordi-
nation between a haven country and the set of its potential investors. We note that beliefs
are of key importance in this process, and these beliefs are themselves endogenous. Our
analysis provides insights into what factors drive the beliefs, the ow of nancial capital
and ultimately countriesdecisions as to whether they will pursue a tax haven business.
Specically, we consider the role of the residence countries level of taxation, penalties
for disclosed o¤shore tax evasion, service fees in tax havens, and di¤erent types of in-
ternational pressure. The framework also sheds light on the question of why countries
4Cf. G20 (The Group of 20 (G20) 2009, p. 4): In particular we agree [...] to take action against non-cooperative
jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public nances and nancial systems.
The era of banking secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today published a list of countries assessed by the Global
Forum against the international standard for exchange of tax information.
5The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 2016, pp. 24, 28) evaluates jurisdictions with respect to their e¤ective implementation
of the information exchange on request. As of July 2016, it has rated 22 jurisdictions as compliant, 60 jurisdictions as
largely compliant, and 12 jurisdictions as partially compliant. Eight jurisdictions revealed shortcomings in their legal and
regulatory frameworks and were blocked from moving to the nal phase of revision in order to be rated.
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would ever choose to comply with international standards of transparency despite the
substantial returns in the tax haven business.
Switzerland, for instance, used to be highly successful in attracting a major share of
the private nancial wealth held o¤shore from all possible origins and was renowned for
its strict bank secrecy laws.6 However, Switzerland has also been a prime target in the
ght against tax havens and, seemingly, has given in to the international pressure in
recent years. It joined the EU Savings Directive, entered information exchange treaties
with several EU countries, and enabled its banks to disclose client information to the US
tax authorities after the banks were indicted in the US for assisting American citizens
with tax evasion.7 Also, investors from Europe and North America relocated their funds
away from Switzerland, often just before the initiatives came into e¤ect or were ultimately
decided.8 Our analysis suggests that Switzerlands compliance choice and such investment
decisions are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
For tax-evading investors, it is important whether a tax haven abandons its secrecy
regime after they have located their assets there. A haven country that decides to adopt
a transparency regime causes risks for those investors who have concealed capital therein.
They may be worse o¤ than they would have been had they simply paid the taxes in their
residence countries. One of the risks is that lifting the secrecy regime may unmask the
investors identities and reveal information about previously accrued capital income to
the tax o¢ ces of the investorshome countries, which may trigger severe penalties. If the
regime change toward transparency comes with an information exchange about previ-
ously accrued income, tax-evading investors cannot avoid such penalties. In particular, a
relocation of their funds to another tax haven would come too late, as it would not clean
their records. The traces from tax evasion in previous years are not erased. A prominent
example of a change in the concealment policy that also a¤ected past transactions are
the negotiations between the US and Swiss banks, which eventually revealed tax evasions
by individual US taxpayers who were then prosecuted.9
6Zucman (2013) and BCG (2009, 2016) estimate Switzerland to be the world market leader for o¤shore private wealth
management, accounting for a market share of more than one quarter.
7For an account of the change in Switzerlands attitude toward its strict bank secrecy, see, for example, Swiss banking
secrecy: Dont ask, wont tell, The Economist, 11 February 2012.
8For anecdotal evidence of such capital relocations during the negotiations between Switzerland and Germany for a new
tax treaty, see Ermittlungen: Steuerfahnder verfolgen Spur nach Asien, Financial Times Deutschland, 10 August 2012,
and more generally, see Switzerland and its rivals: Rise of the midshores, The Economist, 16 February 2013, and regular
remarks in the annual global wealth reports by The Boston Consulting Group, e.g., BCG (2009, 2016).
9 In the rst deal of its kind, Switzerland empowered UBS to turn over information on 4,450 clients to the US tax
authorities. The accounts in question cover the years 2001 through 2008, that is, before the investigations against UBS
became publicly known in 2008. (See Swiss approve deal for UBS to reveal US clients suspected of tax evasion, The New
York Times, 18 June 2010.) By now, almost every Swiss bank has entered a similar information exchange based either on
individual settlements or on the Swiss Bank Program by the US Department of Justice. (See US settles last Swiss bank
case in US $1.3 billion program, Reuters, 27 January 2016.)
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Not all regime changes necessarily lead to an indictment for past tax evasions.10 How-
ever, the type of agreement to be struck depends on unforeseeable contingencies of in-
ternational politics and political majorities.11 The precise nature of a possible regime
transition is di¢ cult to predict. Hence, what matters is the expected cost that comes
with a regime change. If the prosecution and imprisonment of tax evaders is su¢ ciently
likely, its threat is su¢ cient to make honest tax payment more attractive than conceal-
ing capital in a haven country that is likely to convert to a compliance regime within a
foreseeable time frame.12
Turn now to the decision problem of a haven country. It is willing to o¤er a secrecy
regime only if that attracts a su¢ ciently large revenue pool. Without a su¢ cient number
of investors, a haven country bears the cost that results from international pressure, but
enjoys little benets from the tax haven business. On the other hand, a tax haven can only
attract business if the investors can rationally expect the country to provide concealment
opportunities in the future. This creates an important feedback loop in the choices of the
haven country and the secrecy-seeking investors.
Moreover, this complementarity raises deeper issues than some coordination problem
between two players, because the investors themselves do not constitute a single player.
They are many, independent decision-makers. Every single investor assesses whether it is
likely that the country will act as a tax haven in the future, and this likelihood depends,
among other things, on the number of other investors moving their funds to this country.
This generates a second complementarity that exists among investors.
These two complementarities are at the core of our analysis. We show that they gen-
erate a multiplicity of equilibria and create strategic uncertainty in a context that is
otherwise a complete information framework. Yet, in a more realistic setup, investors
face a non-negligible degree of uncertainty as regards the choice of the haven country.
The decision on the concealment policy is made by political actors who may di¤er in their
personal convictions about secrecy laws or the international pressure associated with it.
These psychic costs and benets enter into the cost of operating as a tax haven and
10Some initiatives have provided opportunities to channel funds from one haven country that is about to become compliant
to another tax haven. Johannesen (2014) estimates that the EU Savings Directive reduced EU-owned bank deposits in
Switzerland by 3040%, and that the drop was driven by a relocation of funds or formal ownership to other o¤shore
centers. Similarly, Johannesen and Zucman (2014) nd that the bilateral information exchange treaties following the G20
summit in 2009 caused a relocation of assets to non-compliant tax havens rather than their repatriation.
11The GermanSwiss Tax Treaty ( Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland über Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt), for instance, failed to pass the parliamen-
tary hurdles in the second chamber in Germany 2012, which eventually led to a more far-reaching transparency regime.
Many tax evaders who relied on this agreement were caught and prosecuted around that time due to data leaks and tax
authorities purchasing these data. This also alludes to the risks involved with an imminent regime change.
12This is not to claim that the relocation of funds to non-compliant tax havens is not important. How-
ever, for many tax evaders it is not the preferred option. Between 2009 and June 2014, the US received
more than 45,000 voluntary disclosures of o¤shore accounts which created US $6.5 billion in taxes, inter-
est and penalties. (See https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-o¤shore-voluntary-disclosure-e¤orts-produce-6-5-billion-45-
000-taxpayers-participate.) In the scal year 20142015 alone, Canada received 19,134 voluntary disclosures on Can$1.3
billion of unreported income, of which Can$780 million originated o¤shore. (See the Annual Report to Parliament 2014
2015 by the Canada Revenue Agency.) Finally, between 2010 and 2015, Germany received 123,278 voluntary disclosures.
(See Die späte Reue der Steuersünder. Der Fall Hoeneßwirkt nach: Die Zahl der Selbstanzeigen bleibt auch 2015 hoch,
Handelsblatt, 20 January 2016.)
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are not observable for the investors. We demonstrate that a slight amount of incomplete
information can overcome the problem of strategic uncertainty and result in a unique
equilibrium.
This equilibrium contains a limit regarding the political cost of running a tax haven.
For political costs below the limit, a haven country attracts large capital inows from
tax-evading investors and provides a secrecy regime. For costs above it, investors do not
locate their funds in the haven country, which in turn maintains a transparency regime.
This critical cost limit is a function of the exogenous parameters of the model and has im-
plications for the design of optimal policies. We nd a trade-o¤ between a successful ght
against tax havens and high tax rates, for example, in the course of an international tax
harmonization. High tax rates make it attractive for investors to evade taxes and render
haven countries robust toward political pressure. A similar e¤ect exists for low penalties
for disclosed o¤shore tax evasion, for instance, in the context of special programs with re-
duced nes for tax evaders who voluntarily report their undeclared o¤shore wealth. Many
countries apply such programs to reduce administrative costs, encourage the repatriation
of o¤shore funds or to enlarge the group of tax evaders that can be targeted with a single
initiative.13 However, our results suggest that they also strengthen the resistance of tax
havens against costly pressure. Moreover, we can explain why service fees in tax havens
need not be competed down to zero despite a highly competitive, international nancial
market with multiple active tax havens. Intuitively, high revenues make haven countries
robust toward international pressure and hence trustworthy for secrecy-seeking investors.
1.2 Literature and empirical review
Our analysis is related to a growing literature on tax havens surveyed in Dharmapala
(2008) and Keen and Konrad (2013). Dharmapala and Hines (2009) and Slemrod (2008)
provide empirical support for the widespread view that tax havens tend to be small,
a­ uent island countries that have American or British colonial or territorial roots, and
score particularly well on indices measuring aspects of governance quality, such as the
protection of property rights.14 As tax havens typically attract large amounts of invest-
ments relative to the size of their own economy and population, earnings from or taxes on
the haven industry account for a major share of their public revenues.15 The importance
of the investor protection is studied by Bucovetsky (2014) who focuses on the possibility
that foreign investors might be expropriated by the haven country. Slemrod and Wilson
(2009) argue that small countries have a comparative advantage in becoming tax havens.
13For an overview of voluntary disclosure programs in di¤erent countries and an analysis of the e¤ect of such programs
on compliance rates and public revenues, see Langenmayr (2015).
14The colonial or territorial roots inuence, among other things, a countrys legal and political system, its o¢ cial language,
and its degree of sovereignty/dependency.
15A comparison of the size of tax havens and the amount of international investment that they attract can be found in
Hines (2010, pp. 105111).
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These analyses identify natural candidate countries, some of which act or have acted as
tax havens in the past and may continue this business in the future. A related, empiri-
cal question asks which active tax havens are likely to terminate their provision of tax
sheltering opportunities if o¤ering them also generates a political cost. 16
Another domain in the literature evaluates particular initiatives in the ght against
tax havens. Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2009), Johannesen (2014), and Klautke and
Weichenrieder (2010) study the EU Savings Directive. For an assessment of the G20 Tax
Haven Crackdown, see Johannesen and Zucman (2014). Although most studies address
the e¤ectiveness of the current initiatives, little has been done to understand the in-
centives for a haven country when exposed to international pressure. As an exception,
Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) consider the interaction between several tax havens and
the consequences of a sequential exit for those haven countries that remain active. They
show that the increase in market shares and market power which these remaining tax
havens enjoy makes them increasingly resistant toward international pressure. Pieretti et
al. (2016) contribute to the analysis of the dynamics in the compliance decisions of mul-
tiple tax havens, by allowing them to compete for international ows of o¤shore capital
and also for real economic activity. We consider a single haven country in most parts of
our analysis and discuss generalizations in Section 1.6. Another exception is Pieretti and
Pulina (2015) who study the optimal response by haven countries if the stigmatization
of tax havens makes it more costly for multinational rms to not only shift their prots
to these countries but to also to set up real economic activities there. We look at tax
evasion by private investors and the legal risk that they face when concealing capital in
a tax haven.
Furthermore, the current initiatives against tax havens have triggered a controversial
discussion about the e¤ects of tax havens on global welfare, surveyed by Hines (2010).
Most of this literature considers corporate tax avoidance rather than private tax evasion.
On the upside, tax havens allow high-tax countries to levy a de facto di¤erentiated tax
rate on mobile capital (Hong and Smart 2010), e¤ectively limiting the consequences of a
harmful tax competition to a subset of the tax base (Keen 2001), economic activities in
haven and nearby non-haven countries are found to be complements rather than substi-
tutes (Desai et al. 2006a, 2006b), total tax revenues may increase as non-haven countries
face weaker incentives to enter an aggressive tax competition (Johannesen 2010), and
investors may benet from ercer institutional competition (Pieretti et al. 2013). On the
downside, tax havens may also contribute to excessive tax competition by lowering equi-
librium tax rates, cause wasteful resource expenditures for purely tax arbitrage activities
and the attempt to limit those activities, and increase the shadow price for public rev-
enues in high-tax countries (Slemrod and Wilson 2009). These are important questions,
but they are only tangential to our analysis. We focus on tax havens that o¤er tax shelter-
16Bilicka and Fuest (2014) and Elsayyad (2012) study the role of haven country characteristics and bilateral country pair
attributes for the likelihood of international agreements being signed in the aftermath of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown
in 2009.
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ing opportunities to private capital investors and an important strategic complementarity
that emerges in this context.17
Several authors describe tax havens as juridical entrepreneurs who sell protection from
foreign taxation whenever they nd it protable to do so. 18 These analyses typically treat
the demand for tax sheltering services as a quantity that smoothly reacts to parameter
changes. For the phenomenon we study, the decisions of individual investors, the strategic
complementarity among them, and the self-fullling e¤ect of investorsbeliefs on a haven
countrys actual behavior are crucial and create discontinuous jumps in the tax havens
revenue pool. We deal with the beliefs as to the stability of a countrys potential tax
haven endogenously, and we identify the key drivers for a countrys decision of whether
to provide a secrecy or a transparency regime.
1.3 The role of beliefs
For a start we consider the most simple environment with one haven country H and a
continuum of homogeneous investors i 2 I. The mass of I is normalized to 1. Investors
reside somewhere outside H, and we call this place country R. One can think of R as a
representative high-tax country.
Each individual investor i holds one unit of capital and chooses between two actions
ai 2 f0; 1g. An investor can locate the capital in R, denoted by ai = 0, or can locate it
in H, denoted by ai = 1. The individual choices then add up to a total share of capital
located in H
a =
Z
i2I
aidi. (1.1)
The amount a 2 [0; 1] is observed by the haven country H. This completes stage 1. In
stage 2, country H has the capabilities to operate as a tax haven and chooses h 2 f0; 1g.
The choice h = 0 refers to a behavior in compliance with international standards of
transparency. The choice h = 1 refers to a secrecy regime with concealment opportunities.
The sequencing of choices naturally maps the situation in which investors make long-
term decisions about whether or not to locate their capital in a haven country (stage
1), and in which the haven country makes a time-consistent decision that maximizes its
genuine interests some, possibly considerable, time later (stage 2).19 Tax evaders are then,
17Strategic complementarities are known to generate multiple equilibria in many contexts. Prominent examples are
bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983), currency crises (Obstfeld 1996 and Morris and Shin 1998), sovereign public debt
sustainability (Cole and Kehoe 2000), political accountability and the role of elections as a coordination mechanism (Fearon
2011), capital formation with a time-consistent taxation of capital (Persson and Tabellini 1990), and network e¤ects (Katz
and Shapiro 1994).
18Palan (2002) refers to this process as the commercialization of state sovereignty.
19Alternatively, the haven country may irreversibly commit to whether to o¤er concealment services or not prior to stage
1 and it sticks to this commitment even if no or very few investors show up compared to a high costly pressure. Tax evaders
would not face any risk of being disclosed. This time structure would change our results. However, such a commitment
assumption is di¢ cult to justify as the haven countries are sovereign countries and a commitment is not time-consistent. In
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FIGURE 1.1: Time structure of the coordination game
over time, increasingly vulnerable to the possibility that the haven country will not o¤er
concealment opportunities but will participate in an exchange of tax information in the
future (stage 2). Also note that we study a static setting in which the haven country
decides on h only once, based on the amount of capital a attracted in stage 1.20 A more
generous interpretation of our setup is that H is a country that qualies as a potential
tax haven, for instance, by having been a tax haven in the past. In this case the decision
h = 1 can be interpreted as a continuation of the secrecy regime, and the decision h = 0
can be interpreted as a policy change, an exit from the tax haven business, and the
adoption of a transparency regime. This possible exit decision may take place years later.
The time structure of the game is summarized in Figure 1.1 and is common knowledge
for all players.
If an investor locates the capital in R, the capital is taxed at rate t 2 (0; 1) and the
investor receives a nal income of 1  t.21 Suppose the investor locates the capital in H.
Then the nal income depends on the haven countrys decision. If H o¤ers concealment
opportunities, i.e. h = 1, the investor can successfully evade taxes in R but has to pay
some service fee s 2 (0; t) in the tax haven, and ends up with 1   s. As discussed in
the Introduction, s should not be interpreted as a specic tax or administration fee on
concealed capital earnings, but it results more indirectly from the institutional setup (see,
e.g. Schoen 2005).22
fact, many haven countries recently changed their concealment policies when this seemed to be in their national interest,
including Switzerland  the country whose bank secrecy was considered to be part of its national identity.
20The static analysis drops a number of relevant dynamic issues from the picture. Some of these have been dealt with in
other analyses, such as the last-haven-standing e¤ect in an exit game studied by Elsayyad and Konrad (2012). However,
the complementarities of this framework remain an issue for analyses that adopt dynamic aspects, as we discuss in Section
1.6.
21Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we consider instead a homogeneous return on capital and a tax thereon.
22Banking and asset management fees, for instance, are a major share of the fees paid by investors who conceal their
capital in a tax haven. These fees depend on the legal and institutional structure of the haven country as well as on
the structure of and competition within the nancial sector. Similarly, the governmental surplus from this type of asset
management emerges indirectly. It includes fees and taxes on the business of nancial institutions, wage taxes in this sector,
and further indirect spillovers. Therefore we do not consider s to be a straight choice variable. We take s as given. We also
assume that what investors pay as fees equals the government revenue. The indirect channels that determine s also make
it less straightforward, but potentially interesting, to study the e¤ects of competition between tax havens.
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If H operates a transparency regime, i.e. h = 0, the tax authorities in R learn about the
investors o¤shore funds and impose some detection and/or compliance cost  , leading
to a payo¤ 1    . We allow (t; z) to be a function of the tax rate t and a possible ne
z > 0 for previously concealed capital, which may also include some transaction costs for
relocating the funds. Generally, we expect that  (t; z) > t, and that  (t; z) is increasing
both in t and z. We also assume that d
dt
<  s
t s . The assumption is fairly weak as
 s
t s > 1
and is used only for Corollary 1.23 The payo¤ for an investor can therefore be written as
i (ai; h) =
8><>:
1  t if ai = 0
1   if ai = 1 and h = 0
1  s if ai = 1 and h = 1
. (1.2)
We note that investors may also invest in o¤shore centers for reasons other than to evade
taxes, such as diversication, strong institutions, nancial expertise or insurance against
leviathan governments. Some investors may also enjoy the combination of concealment
opportunities and the quality of the property rights regime in the haven country. An
important paper by Pieretti et al. (2014) focuses precisely on the conditions for which
o¤shore nancial centers operate as tax havens only, i.e. undercut tax rates, and the
conditions for which they also operate as safe havens, i.e. provide a better institutional
framework.24 Within our more narrow framework, all investors are homogeneous and
these additional motives are absent. As tax-compliant investors in the tax haven have to
pay the service fee s and the tax t, they would not like to locate their capital in the haven
country.
The haven countrys payo¤ depends on the aggregate investment it can attract and on
its own decision. If H operates a transparency regime, its payo¤ is normalized to zero. If
H acts as a tax haven, it benets to the extent of s from each investor whose capital is
deposited therein.25 This yields total revenues equal to sa. However, the haven country
also bears an operating cost, which is higher if the amount of international pressure on
tax havens is higher. We assume that it consists of a xed cost , a unit cost c 2 [0; s),
and sums up to
 + ca. (1.3)
We allow  2 ; , where  < 0 < s c < . One might expect that  > 0, but a country
may also derive some intrinsic benet from running a secrecy regime. For instance, its
decision-makers may be proud to be helping honest business people from abroad avoid
23Note that d
dt
 1 is a natural assumption. Consider the case h = 0 when capital-concealing investors cannot avoid
being taxed in R at rate t. If, in this case, the tax rate applies to the initial capital stock, this leads to  = 1  t  z. If the
tax rate applies to the capital stock net of nes, this results in  = (1  t) (1  z). In both cases, it is true that d
dt
 1.
24To account for fully tax-compliant investors who enjoy other qualities of o¤shore centers requires heterogeneity among
investors and additional qualities of the haven country. Such a generalized framework need not a¤ect the central results of
our analysis, provided that there are no strategic links between the two types of asset management.
25 In the literature, tax havens are usually assumed to charge a at service fee per account or per investor. However, an
investor with o¤shore deposits worth several hundred million dollars can still be expected to pay more than a middle-class
wage earner. In our model with homogeneous investors, both interpretations of a xed or a proportional service fee are
equivalent.
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FIGURE 1.2: Equilibrium characterization with complete information
illegitimate expropriation claims, may feel that giving up its bank secrecy is a sacrice
of the national identity, or some such reason. The resulting prot for the haven country
upon providing concealment opportunities is (s  c) a . Summarized, the payo¤ for the
haven country is given by
H (a; h) =
(
0 if h = 0
(s  c) a   if h = 1 . (1.4)
We assume the service fee s, the tax rate t, and the detection cost  to be nite and
exogenous. In a more general setup, one could consider the residence country to determine
t and  , and the haven country to inuence s. We discussed in the Introduction that s
need not be a variable of direct choice, but we consider the impact of these parameters on
the equilibrium outcome in more detail in Section 1.5. Furthermore, to make our analysis
economically interesting and non-trivial, we restrict the allowed parameter ranges such
that s < t <  . If the service fee in the tax haven exceeds the tax rate s  t, an investor
would have nothing to gain from locating capital in H. Similarly, if   t, an investor
would have nothing to lose when trying to evade taxes. We also restrict the tax havens
variable cost c in comparison to the service fee such that s   c > 0, which refers to a
situation in which a country that operates as a tax haven prefers to have a larger pool of
investment.
In the following we solve for the equilibrium of the game for every possible combination
of , c, and s satisfying the previously discussed parameter conditions. We impose the
standard requirement of subgame perfection and obtain the equilibrium characterization
as stated in Proposition 1 and graphically summarized in Figure 1.2.
Proposition 1 (i) For  < 0, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by
ai = 1 for all i 2 I and h = 1. All investors evade taxes and the haven country provides
a secrecy regime.
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(ii) For  > s   c, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by ai = 0 for
all i 2 I and h = 0. All investors meet their tax liabilities and the haven country provides
a transparency regime.
(iii) For 0    s   c, both (ai = 0 for all i 2 I and h = 0) and (ai = 1 for all i 2 I
and h = 1) are subgame perfect equilibria. Furthermore, there exist equilibria in mixed
strategies.
Proof. Consider (i): If  < 0, then (s  c) a   > 0 for all possible a 2 [0; 1]. This makes
h = 1 a dominant choice for the haven country, independent of the investorsbehavior.
Anticipating that the haven country will o¤er concealment opportunities, the investors
unique optimal choice in stage 1 is ai = 1.
Consider (ii): If  > s   c, then (s  c) a    < 0 for all possible a 2 [0; 1]. This
makes h = 0 a dominant choice for the haven country, independent of the investors
behavior. Anticipating that the haven country will not o¤er concealment opportunities,
the investorsunique optimal choice in stage 1 is ai = 0.
Consider (iii), when 0    s   c. In stage 2, the haven country knows the amount
of attracted capital a. So Hs optimal choice is h = 1 if a > = (s  c), and h = 0 if a <
= (s  c). For a = = (s  c), H is just indi¤erent and any pure action or randomization
thereof is an optimal choice. In stage 1, the investors decide where to locate their capital
depending on what they expect of h in stage 2, which, given the optimal reply by the haven
country, depends on the aggregate outcome of the other investorsactions a =
R
ajdj.
Note that an individual investor is choice ai does not signicantly a¤ect the aggregate
outcome a, as there is a continuum of investors. If all investors believe that a  = (s  c),
leading to h = 1, then their optimal choices are ai = 1 for all i 2 I. These actions result
in a = 1 and h = 1, conrming the investors beliefs. This establishes that (ai = 1
for all i 2 I and h = 1) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. If all investors believe that
a  = (s  c), leading to h = 0, then their optimal choices are ai = 0 for all i 2 I. These
actions result in a = 0 and h = 0, conrming the investorsbeliefs. This establishes that
(ai = 0 for all i 2 I and h = 0) is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We now turn to the case a = = (s  c). If this equality holds, the haven country
is just indi¤erent and any pure action h 2 f0; 1g or randomization thereof is optimal.
This allows for the further equilibria in mixed strategies for the range  2 [0; s  c]. Let
Pr (h = 1 ja = = (s  c)) denote the probability that H will choose h = 1 when being
indi¤erent. For 0 <  < s   c, a = = (s  c) implies that only a fraction of investors
will locate their capital in H. For that to be optimal, the investors must be indi¤erent
between ai = 0 and ai = 1. This indi¤erence holds if Pr (h = 1 ja = = (s  c)) = p, where
p is the solution to the investorsindi¤erence condition
p (1  s) + (1  p) (1  ) = (1  t) . (1.5)
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There are many combinations of investorschoices that result in an aggregate investment
of a = =(s   c) in H.26 Any of these, together with Pr (h = 1 ja = =(s  c)) = p
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Finally, consider the borders of the interval [0; s   c]. For  = s   c, the choice
h = 1 is inside the set of optimal choices if all investors, except for a set of measure
zero, choose ai = 1. This is optimal for them if H randomizes with some probability
Pr (h = 1 ja = =(s  c)) 2 [p; 1]. Similarly, for  = 0, optimality of h = 0 requires that
all investors, except for a set of measure zero, choose ai = 1. This is optimal for them if
H randomizes with some probability Pr (h = 1 ja = =(s  c)) 2 [0; p].
For the range  2 [0; s  c], Proposition 1 identies the decisive role of the investors
beliefs for the actual equilibrium outcome. If investors believe that the haven country will
comply with international standards of transparency, they will prefer to stay away from
H. In response, the haven country will choose to avoid international pressure and pursue
a transparency regime. If instead investors believe that the haven country will provide
e¤ective protection against inquiries from the domestic tax authorities, they prefer to
evade taxes and locate their capital in H. This makes the concealment business protable
and the haven country will then choose to provide concealment opportunities. We nd
that the haven countrys decision to provide a secrecy regime and the investorsdecisions
to locate their capital in the tax haven are strategic complements. As the investors move
rst, their beliefs about the haven countrys choice establish an investment behavior
that makes the country act in line with their beliefs. Therefore, several sets of mutually
consistent investors beliefs exist, and these beliefs then determine whether the haven
country will pursue a secrecy or a transparency regime.
Moreover, these self-enforcing beliefs create a strategic complementarity among the
group of individual investors. When deciding where to locate the capital, each investor
individually assesses the likelihood of a secrecy regime. As we show above, this probability
depends among other things on the amount of capital deposited in the tax haven, and
hence, on the actions of the other investors. If an individual investor expects a large share
of the other investors to locate their capital in H, the individual investor can be condent
of the haven country o¤ering concealment opportunities and will consider it protable to
locate the capital in the haven country, too. Inversely, if an individual investor believes
that no or only few other investors will locate their capital in H, the haven country is
likely to divulge tax information to the residence country and the individual investor is
better o¤not trying to hide capital in H. So there is a coordination problem among many
individual investors in which the outcome and whether the haven country will operate
as a tax haven or not is determined by the investorsbeliefs, the beliefs as to the other
investorsbeliefs, and even higher-order beliefs.
26For instance, there is one equilibrium that has all investors playing the same mixed strategy in which each investor
chooses ai = 1 with probability = (s  c). Other equilibria contain all investors playing pure strategies that di¤er across
investors. Again, other equilibria have some investors playing pure strategies and other investors playing mixed strategies.
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Intuitively, we expect that these beliefs are driven by the fundamentals of a haven
country, such as institutional aspects, a countrys track record of its secrecy regime, and
norms and values that are anchored in the society of the haven country.27 However, except
for extreme values with  < 0 or  > s   c, Proposition 1 comes with little predictive
power. An optimistic interpretation suggests that even a small amount of pressure, in
terms of a small but positive , may be enough to destroy the tax haven business model.
But in fact we cannot even conclude that increased international pressure will make it
more likely that a haven country will comply with international transparency standards.
The indeterminacy is caused by the particularly simple information structure con-
sidered so far. Common knowledge of the cost parameters  and c allows the players
equilibrium beliefs and actions to be perfectly aligned contingent on the combination of
 and c that is known to prevail. While this approach underlines the importance of in-
vestorsrst and higher-order beliefs for the haven countrys concealment policy, the set
of beliefs that prevails is in the end determined exogenously, pointing to factors outside
the model. In a more realistic setup, investors face incomplete information on the true
cost of operating a tax haven. Including some small amounts of incomplete information
in our framework is not just some tool to introduce another grain of reality to our model,
it will also allow us to deal with the investorsbeliefs endogenously and yield a unique
equilibrium prediction that depends on the parameters of the model. Such a setup is
commonly referred to as a global game, which was initiated by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), and is reviewed, for example, in Morris and Shin
(2003).28
1.4 Small amounts of incomplete information
The cost of providing a secrecy regime is given by (1.3) and was common knowledge in
Section 1.3. For reasons explained above and in the Introduction, we now assume that the
xed cost parameter  is incompletely observed by the investors.29 More specically, we
assume that nature determines the true values of  and c. The value of c remains common
knowledge, but the value of  is known only to the haven country. Each investor receives an
individual and private signal xi = +"i, where  2 (0; 1] is a scaling parameter and "i is
27For empirical analyses on the characteristics that make countries likely to operate as tax havens, see Dharmapala and
Hines (2009) and Slemrod (2008). Some of the driving factors are also mentioned in Section 1.2.
28The global game approach has already been applied to many di¤erent environments with a coordination problem
and can be considered a standard tool in the coordination literature. Applications include studies on currency crises, debt
pricing, bank runs, political revolutions, and the adoption of new network technologies. See, e.g., Morris and Shin (2003, pp.
7177) for a review of the most common applications. The approach has been broadened in many directions, for example, to
allow for heterogeneous agents, such as including single investors with a non-negligible inuence on the aggregate outcome
(Corsetti et al. 2004), or allowing for di¤erent wealth levels and/or payo¤ variables (Sakovics and Steiner 2012).
29Recall from the Introduction that the decision on the concealment policy is made by political actors such as country
leaders. Emotionally, they may cope di¤erently with international pressure or may di¤er in their personal convictions. We
assume that their psychic costs and benets enter into the xed cost component  and are not publicly observable. A
similar reason for incomplete information in the context of international bargaining that draws on the mental constitution
and the potential psychic elements of costs and benets in the minds of political decision-makers is applied in Konrad and
Thum (2014).
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the realization of a random variable e"i with a continuous cumulative distribution function
F (), which has support on the interval  1
2
; 1
2

.30 We require e"i to be identically and
independently distributed across investors and to be independent of the true operating
cost . Similarly, xi is the realization of a random variable exi = +e"i. Investors have no
prior information on the true cost and learn about  only through their private signals. So
we assume that  is the realization of a random variable e that is uniformly distributed
over

; 

, where  <   and  > s  c+ .31 We discuss the importance and validity of
the assumption on the allowed parameter range below. Then, except for signals close to
the boundaries  and , an investor with signal xi forms the belief that e is distributed
as xi   e"i, and for a given  an investors signal exi is distributed according to F  xi  .
Everything apart from the true underlying  and the actual values of the other investors
signals remains common knowledge.
For reasons of clarity and brevity, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in
which all investors follow the same cut-o¤ strategy. A cut-o¤ strategy for an investor i
is described by a cut-o¤ value x of the investors signal xi such that i chooses ai = 1 if
xi  x, and ai = 0 otherwise. The assumption can be weakened and the uniqueness result
can be generalized using standard reasoning.32 Moreover, to avoid technical complications
that arise if a players optimal choice is on the boundary of an open set, we impose tie-
breaking rules as follows. If indi¤erent, the haven country operates a secrecy regime, and
an investor who is indi¤erent locates the capital in H.33
Proposition 2 The game with incomplete information has a unique symmetric perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. In this equilibrium, the haven country
provides a secrecy regime (h = 1) if and only if
  E (s; c; t;  ) = (s  c) t  s
   s , (1.6)
and each investor locates the capital in the haven country (ai = 1) if and only if
xi  xE (s; c; t;  ; ) = (s  c) t  s
   s + F
 1

t  s
   s

. (1.7)
30Note that we will solve for the equilibrium of the game for any level of  2 (0; 1] including very small but positive
values of .
31A uniform prior probability distribution can be seen as a limiting case when the individual signals become very precise
compared to any prior information of . For a discussion on how this assumption can be signicantly weakened, see Morris
and Shin (2003, pp. 7786). They show that any well-behaved prior distribution becomes approximately uniform as  ! 0.
Hence, for a small , our setting approximates one with a non-uniform prior.
32There is a standard proof in the literature showing that the derived equilibrium is the only one in the entire strategy
space to survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For example, see Morris and Shin (2003, pp.
6467).
33 In the literature on global games, the equilibrium is sometimes described as being essentially unique because the players
are indi¤erent at their cut-o¤ values, where any action can be rationalized. Note, however, that this situation occurs with
a zero probability mass.
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Proof. Consider stage 2. The haven country observes a, knows , and requires an invest-
ment pool of = (s  c) to break even. So H chooses h = 1 if a  = (s  c), and h = 0 if
a < = (s  c).
Consider now stage 1. We show that there is a unique cut-o¤ value x = xE such that,
if a mass of investors of size 1 follows the cut-o¤ strategy characterized by xE, it is
optimal for every individual investor to also follow this strategy. The amount a in the
haven country is not signicantly a¤ected by the choice of an individual investor, but is
fully determined by the decisions of all other investors. It is therefore a function of the
investorscommon cut-o¤value x and the set of realized signals to the investors j 2 In fig.
As the error terms e"j are identically and independently distributed, and because there is
a continuum of investors, the share of investors who locate their capital in H is equal to
the probability of any single investor j observing a signal exj  x. Given , this probability
is Pr (exj  x j ) = F  x  . So we can write
a (x; ) = F

x  


, (1.8)
which is continuous in both arguments and non-increasing in .
Figure 1.3 illustrates the aggregate investment a owing to the haven country as a
function of  for three di¤erent levels of x. The gure also depicts the required investment
for the tax haven to break even, = (s  c). We see that (1.8) andHs break even condition
have a single crossing point  (x), dened by
 (x) = (s  c)F

x   (x)


. (1.9)
For a given cut-o¤ strategy with x being chosen by a mass of investors of size 1, H
provides a secrecy regime for all   (x), and a transparency regime for  > (x).
Note that  as in (1.9) is continuous in x, equal to 0 for x   1
2
, equal to s   c for
x  s  c+ 1
2
, and strictly increasing in x with a slope of
d (x)
dx
=
(s  c)F 0

x (x)


 + (s  c)F 0

x (x)

 < 1 (1.10)
for x 2   1
2
; s  c+ 1
2


.
Let us now turn to the decision of an individual investor i. Given the observed signal xi,
the cut-o¤ value x characterizing the strategy of all other investors, and anticipating that
H provides concealment opportunities if and only if e  (x), i assesses the likelihood
of a secrecy regime to be
p(xi; x) = Pr
e  (x) j xi = 1  F xi    (x)


. (1.11)
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The investor i chooses ai = 1 if p (xi; x)  p, and ai = 0 if p (xi; x) < p, where p is the
solution to the investorsindi¤erence condition
p =
   t
   s , (1.12)
also given in (1.5). The subjective probability p(xi; x) that i assigns to the outcome
with a sustained tax haven business is equal to 1 for xi   (x)   12, equal to 0 for
xi   (x)+ 12, and is strictly decreasing in xi for xi 2
 
 (x)  1
2
;  (x) + 1
2


. So for
a given cut-o¤ strategy played by all other investors, is best response is to also follow a
cut-o¤ strategy around some x, dened by
p (x; x) = p . (1.13)
Inserting the expressions from Equations (1.11) and (1.12) into (1.13) and subsequently
solving the equation for x yields
x (x) =  (x) + F 1

t  s
   s

. (1.14)
Any equilibrium requires x = x. For all common cut-o¤ values x   1
2
, x (x) =
F 1
 
t s
 s

>  1
2
. Similarly, for all x  s c+ 1
2
, x (x) = s c+F 1   t s
 s

< s c+ 1
2
.
In the intermediary range x 2   1
2
; s  c+ 1
2


, x (x) is strictly increasing with a slope
of dx

dx
= d
(x)
dx
< 1. Therefore, there is one and only one intersection of x (x) with the
locus x = x, which denes x = x (x)  xE, the unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤
strategies.
Finally, it remains to derive xE and E as stated in Proposition 2. We dene E by
E    xE. Evaluating (1.14) at xE gives xE = E + F 1   t s
 s

. Substituting it into
(1.9), also evaluated at xE, yields
E = (s  c)F
 
E + F 1
 
t s
 s
  E

!
= (s  c) t  s
   s . (1.15)
For an intuition for the unique equilibrium cut-o¤ strategy, assume all investors coor-
dinate to switch around some common cut-o¤ value x. Figure 1.3 depicts three potential
candidates: x0, xE, and x00. An investor i who then receives the critical signal xi = x
believes that all investors with a smaller signal xj  x will locate their capital in H and
investors with a larger signal xj > x will locate their capital in R. Also, except for small
boundary regions close to  and , the investor has no information other than the individ-
ually observed signal. So regardless of whether the investors coordinate on a high or low
cut-o¤ value, an investor who then observes the critical signal always expects the same
amount of investments in H, E [a (x; ) jxi = x ] iid= Pr (exj  x jxi = x) = Pr (e"j   e"i  0),
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FIGURE 1.3: Amount of capital in the haven country for di¤erent cut-o¤ strategies
plotted against the required investment for the tax haven to break even
which is independent of x. On the other hand, the required revenue pool for a tax haven
to break even is strictly increasing. Hence, there is a unique x for which an investor,
upon observing the critical signal xi = x, is indi¤erent, and for which it is indeed opti-
mal to follow a cut-o¤ strategy around this value. Figure 1.3 also illustrates the subjec-
tive probability that such an investor will assign to the outcome with a secrecy regime,
p (xi = x; x)
(1:8),(1:11)
= 1   a (x;  (x)). The probability is monotonically decreasing in x
and satises the investorsindi¤erence condition only if x = xE.
Proposition 2 does not make an equilibrium selection argument based on axiomatic
considerations. Instead, the equilibrium is derived from plausible assumptions on the
information available to investors. To arrive at this equilibrium, we require very few ad-
ditional assumptions. One of them is that the support of the prior probability distribution
of  covers a su¢ ciently wide range. In particular, investors must have a dominant action
to locate their capital in H for very low levels of , and to locate their capital in R for
very large levels of . Still, it seems plausible that investors perceive tax evasion as being
risky, and think that such cost levels are possible.
The proposition provides a clear-cut equilibrium prediction for the outcome of the ght
against tax havens. It identies a hyperplane
E (c) = s
t  s
   s   c
t  s
   s (1.16)
and characterizes the equilibrium depending on the haven countrys operating cost pa-
rameters (; c). For combinations of (; c) below the hyperplane the equilibrium predicts
an e¤ective secrecy regime, and above it the equilibrium predicts that the haven country
will comply with the standards of transparency. Notably, there are combinations of (; c)
for which the equilibrium predicts a compliant behavior (h = 0) although an active tax
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FIGURE 1.4: Equilibrium characterization with incomplete information
haven business with all investors locating their funds therein would yield higher payo¤s
for both the haven country and the investors.
In the equilibrium, a single investors decision to locate capital in H need not be per-
fectly aligned with the haven countrys decision to operate as a tax haven for two reasons,
both depend on the degree of uncertainty  and the shape of the noise distribution F .
First, an investor can observe a signal that is too far away from the true . Second, the
equilibrium cut-o¤ value xE may di¤er slightly from the haven countrys equilibrium cost
threshold E (). As the amount of uncertainty becomes very small, i.e.  ! 0, both
sources of coordination failure disappear and xE () ! E ().34 To simplify interpreta-
tions and enhance the tractability of the subsequent calculations, we assume this limiting
case from here on for the remainder of the chapter. We will point out when the assump-
tion becomes important and discuss how the results would change with a larger . The
equilibrium for this limiting case is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
With the clear-cut equilibrium prediction at hand, we are able to derive implications
for the design of optimal policies in the ght against tax havens.
1.5 Policy implications
The cost limit identied by Proposition 2 is a function of the parameters s, c, t, and  ,
where (t; z) is a function of the tax rate t and the ne z. It thereby carries further impli-
cations about how changes in these parameters a¤ect the equilibrium interaction between
the haven country and its potential investors. One may argue that all variables such as s,
c, t, z, and  along with a and h are endogenous choice variables. However, decisions on
s, t, and z are predominantly inuenced by many factors, including a countrys attitude
toward redistribution, its needs or opportunities for publicly provided goods, its ability
34Remember that we solved for the equilibrium of the game for any level of  2 (0; 1] including very small but positive
values of . For a discussion on the di¤erence between common knowledge and very small amounts of incomplete information,
see, e.g., Carlsson and van Damme (1993, pp. 1,0081,010).
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to generate tax revenue, and its exposure to international tax competition. Also, general
attitudes and value judgements may play a role. Similarly, the size of c and  may be
strongly inuenced by institutional and technological factors. In this line of reasoning, we
apply comparative static analyses in which the variables are predetermined and xed at
the stage when the haven country and the investors interact. This approach is di¤erent
from considering an extended game in which a high-tax country or a group thereof are
players in a game theoretic sense or in which the service fee in the tax haven becomes
part of the strategy choices.
First, our model relates the residence countrys level of taxation and the penalties
for disclosed o¤shore tax evasion to the amount of international pressure that a haven
country can resist and still operate a secrecy regime. So we can study the implications of
the tax rate t and the ne z on the prospects of the ght against tax havens. Corollary
1 describes this relationship in more detail.35
Corollary 3 The required amount of international pressure to make the haven country
comply with international transparency standards is higher for a higher t, and lower for
a higher z.
Proof. For a given a, the cost of providing a secrecy regime as in (1.3) is higher if the
level of international pressure is higher. Hence, everything else being constant, a higher
equilibrium cost threshold E () requires a larger amount of international pressure to
make the haven country compliant. Now, note that the function E (s; c; t;  ) is increasing
in t
dE ()
dt
=
s  c
(   s)2

   t+ (t  s)

1  d
dt

> 0 (1.17)
as d
dt
<  s
t s , and decreasing in z
dE ()
dz
= ( 1) s  c
(   s)2 (t  s)
d
dz
< 0. (1.18)
Intuitively, a high tax rate or a low ne creates a high relative payo¤ for tax evaders.
So for the investors to be indi¤erent to the location decision, the probability of an active
tax haven must only be moderate. This translates into a wide range of signals for which
the investors locate their capital in H. In turn, the haven country attracts a large revenue
pool for a large space of cost parameter combinations. As the decisions of the investors
and of the haven country are strategic complements, they mutually reinforce each other
35Strictly speaking, a high-tax country cares about the amount of evaded tax revenue, which is determined by the cut-o¤
value xE characterizing the investorsstrategy rather than the haven countrys cost threshold E . However, the e¤ects of
the tax rate and the ne on xE are qualitatively the same and even slightly stronger than the e¤ects on E , with the exact
magnitude depending on  and the shape of F .
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and the haven country will pursue a secrecy regime even for large amounts of international
pressure.
For this result, we require that d
dt
<  s
t s . Note that a change in t has two direct e¤ects
on E: a positive e¤ect via the tax liability that an investor can possibly evade and a
negative e¤ect via the cost that a disclosed tax evader has to face. Our assumption ensures
that the variable t denotes primarily a tax rate rather than a penalty for disclosed tax
evasion. All additional compliance/detection costs for identied tax evaders are included
in z.
Our results suggest that the chances for a transparency regime and no o¤shore tax eva-
sion are better if high-tax countries impose low tax rates and severe penalties for disclosed
tax evasion. This reveals an inherent trade-o¤ between the ght against tax havens and
high tax rates, for instance, in the course of an international tax harmonization. If tax
competition is overly excessive and considered harmful, it is a popular countermeasure
to harmonize tax rates in order to maintain or possibly increase the level of taxation.
However, Corollary 1 shows that a high level of taxation renders haven countries robust
against costly pressure and thereby deteriorates the prospect of a successful initiative
against them. Similarly, in order to increase public revenues, many countries o¤er spe-
cial programs with reduced nes for tax evaders who voluntarily report their undeclared
o¤shore wealth. We nd that such arrangements not only encourage tax evasion on the
personal level but also strengthen the resistance of haven countries against international
pressure.
Second, we can consider the impact of the service fee s on the haven countrys equilib-
rium concealment policy, which is characterized in Corollary 2.
Corollary 4 The maximum E (c) for which the haven country provides a secrecy regime
in equilibrium is obtained for an interior service fee of
s =   
p
(   c) (   t). (1.19)
Proof. The service fee s which maximizes E (c) must be positive. If, on the contrary,
the service fee is weakly negative s  0, an active tax haven yields non-positive unit
prots of s  c.36 Inserting non-positive unit prots into the haven countrys break even
condition implies that H will not provide a secrecy regime for positive levels of , which
contradicts a maximum of E (c). Similarly, the service fee s must be smaller than the
tax rate t. If the service fee equals the tax rate s = t, the same logic as in the proof of
Proposition 2 yields E (c) = 0, which is clearly not a maximum of E (c). If the service
fee exceeds the tax rate s > t, no investor will locate capital in H, i.e. a = 0, and H will
again not provide a secrecy regime for positive levels of .
36Note that for negative levels of the service fee s < 0 the allowed parameter range for the unit cost of pursuing a secrecy
regime c 2 [0; s) is an empty set. The statement above holds true for any weakly positive unit cost c  0.
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In the interior range s 2 (0; t), the function E (s; c; t;  ) has a maximum at (1.19)
because its second derivative d
2E()
ds2
=  2  t
( s)2   2 (s  c)  t( s)3 < 0 is negative for all
s 2 (0; t) and its rst derivative dE()
ds

s=s
= t s

 s   (s   c)  t( s)2 = 0 equals zero for
s = s.
Neither a very high nor a very low service fee are best for the haven country. Rather,
interpreting  as being positively related with the international pressure, Corollary 2 sug-
gests that the haven country can withstand larger amounts of international pressure if
the service fee is at an interior level. For a very small service fee, the haven country will
pursue a transparency regime even for small amounts of international pressure because,
even if all investors located their capital in H, the return on supplying concealment op-
portunities is simply very low. For a very large service fee close to the residence countrys
tax rate and for low values of , the haven country will also pursue a transparency regime
as it can barely attract a revenue pool. Even if it provided concealment opportunities,
investors would benet only very little from them and would therefore be reluctant to
locate their funds in H. Taking both e¤ects together, the haven country is more likely to
operate as a tax haven if the service fee is at an interior level.
Corollary 2 provides insights into the pricing of services in tax havens. It contributes
to the explanation of why tax haven businesses typically yield large prots despite being
active in a competitive, global nancial market. It is those prots that render haven coun-
tries robust against international initiatives and make them trustworthy for tax-evading
investors. Competition between multiple tax havens may of course exert downward pres-
sure on the service fees in tax havens, but it is unlikely to drive equilibrium prices down to
zero. Investors would not trust a tax haven with concealment opportunities and a service
fee close to zero, because international initiatives that push the xed cost  of providing
a secrecy regime above zero will automatically drive such a tax haven out of the market.
Third, our analysis contains two parameters that determine the haven countrys cost
of providing a secrecy regime as given in (1.3), a xed component  and a proportional
component c. Both parameters may be inuenced by international pressure. Corollary 3
exploits the incentives for a residence country or a group thereof, such as the OECD, to
inuence one or the other component, or both.
Corollary 5 The two types of cost  and c are substitutes, with d
E
dc
=   t s
 s .
The result follows directly from (1.16) and is intuitive. It is, however, less obvious,
given the non-monotonic relationship between E and s in Corollary 2 and the similarity
between an increase in s and a decrease in c in the model framework. Note that a change
in s has two direct e¤ects: one for the objective function of the haven country and one
for the objective function of the investors. In contrast, a change in c a¤ects only the
objective function of the haven country and, much like a higher , a higher c makes it
less protable to provide a secrecy regime.
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1.6 Accounting for multiple tax havens
For the remainder, we discuss a setting with multiple haven countries. This will lead
further to several issues. We show how the results from the static, complete information
game with one haven country can be generalized to include multiple haven countries. For
that, some changes in the notation are needed. We denote the set of haven countries as
H = fH1; H2; :::; Hng. The set I is the set of investors, which has the measure m > 0.
The investor is pure strategy is denoted as a choice ai 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; ng, such that ai = 0
if i invests in R, and ai = k if i invests in Hk. Investors could also randomize, but for the
remainder we will focus on pure strategies only. Each haven country Hks pure strategy
is a choice hk 2 f0; 1g, i.e. whether to comply with transparency standards (hk = 0) or
to operate as a tax haven (hk = 1). We dene
(aR; aH1 ; aH2 ; :::; aHn) 
Z
ai=0
1di;
Z
ai=1
1di; :::;
Z
ai=n
1di

, (1.20)
where
R
ai=k
1di denotes the mass of investors who locate their capital in Hk. Suppose
further that the parameters s, t, z, and  are dened as in the previous sections, but
allow for the haven countrys specic cost parameters (k; ck).
Proposition 6 Investorslocation choices ai leading to (aR; aH1 ; aH2 ; :::; aHn) and a vec-
tor (h1; h2; :::; hn) constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium, if
hk =
(
0 if aHk < k= (s  ck)
1 if aHk  k= (s  ck)
(1.21)
and each ai fullls the following conditions: ai = 0 if aHk < k= (s  ck) for all k = 1; :::; n;
ai 6= 0 and ai 6= j for all j with aHj < j= (s  cj) if aHk  k= (s  ck) holds for at least
one haven country Hk.
A proof follows the same logic as in the rst paragraphs of (iii) in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. (1.21) describes the time-consistent choice of haven countries. Given (1.21), the
individual investors have an incentive to locate their capital in R if they anticipate that
none of the haven countries attracts the critical amount of investment. If investors an-
ticipate that one or several of the haven countries attract at least the critical quantity
of investment, the investors have an incentive to locate their capital in one of the haven
countries that is anticipated to attract su¢ cient funds. If several countries fulll the
condition aHk  k= (s  ck), the investors are indi¤erent between them and may make
decisions such that the resulting capital allocation (aR; aH1 ; aH2 ; :::; aHn) conrms their
expectations. However, the investors prefer each of these location choices to locating the
capital in R or in one of the haven countries that has too little funds and will choose to
comply with the transparency standards.
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As a result, none, one, or several haven countries may attract the critical amounts of
investment that are needed to make the tax haven business su¢ ciently protable. All other
haven countries attract zero investment and do not o¤er concealment opportunities. The
equilibrium with ai = 0 for all i 2 I and hk = 0 for all k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng from Proposition
1 is in this set. Also, the equilibrium in which one haven country monopolizes the whole
market and attracts all investment m is in this set, if (s  ck)m  k is fullled for
at least one haven country Hk 2 H. The complementarities are still in place but the
multiplicity of available haven countries allows for further equilibria and also creates
additional coordination problems.
We may also consider and allow for a relocation of funds between haven countries.
Consider a haven country H that operates in an extended framework in which there is a
second haven country H^ that investors may use to shift their funds to should the haven
country under consideration choose to pursue a transparency regime. Let us take this
second investment opportunity as guaranteed and exogenous, basically assuming away
the protability considerations for H^ that drive the logic of the time-consistent choices
of sovereign countries in the main part of our chapter. If the service fee in this second
tax haven is lower than the tax rate t in country R, the payo¤ outcome 1    is to be
interpreted as the return on relocating the funds to H^. Apart from this, the logic of the
equilibrium analysis remains una¤ected. A relocation of the o¤shore wealth to H^ typically
does not solve an investors problem when being identied as a tax evader, particularly
if we adopt the more generous interpretation of the model alluded to in Section 1.3.
In the more generous interpretation, the decision on h is the decision between a haven
policy continuation or a policy change, which is made much later than the investment
decisions and under the inuence of international pressure. If funds were located in a
tax haven that some years later decides to lift its secrecy regulations and agree to full
transparency, a relocation of the funds to a di¤erent tax haven may come too late. The tax
evasion on previously accrued capital income becomes visible and cannot be neutralized
or concealed by shifting the capital to another haven. In the Introduction we referred
to a recent empirical example, when the policy change in Switzerland revealed previous
tax evasions by US citizens, who were then prosecuted by the US authorities.37 Fines z
apply and the tax rate t, which has been evaded, may inuence the cost that accrues to
a tax-evading investor if h = 0, even if the funds are not repatriated but are relocated
elsewhere.
There are further dynamic issues which we bypass because they are orthogonal to the
problem we study. A truly dynamic framework would endogenize many of the competition
parameters that are exogenous in our analysis. Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) address
competition aspects in an exit game among several haven countries, but they removed
37Recall from the Introduction the example of the recent crackdown on Swiss banks by US courts, explained in detail
in Footnote 9. There might be other empirical examples in which investors were able to keep their identities a secret by
relocating their funds to a di¤erent tax haven early enough. But it is the mere possibility that a haven country can release
information on past transactions and make a tax evading investor worse o¤ than by simply paying the tax due in country
R that drives the logic of our analysis.
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the issue of strategic complementarity in the decisions of investors from the picture. They
assume that investors make a uniform choice as a group, and act as a single player. They
highlight that a last-haven-standing e¤ect can make it attractive for a haven country to
persist, because the fees that tax havens attract in the equilibrium are to some extent a
function of the market concentration and the competitive pressure among havens. The
results of this analysis ask for a coordinated ght against tax havens that increases the
operating costs for all haven countries. Otherwise, with a sequential approach, haven
countries may try to hold out in order to obtain higher earnings in a more concentrated
market for concealment services.
1.7 Concluding remarks
Our model provides insights into why and when haven countries choose to provide a
secrecy regime, and when they decide to comply with international standards of trans-
parency. We identify a key factor driving their decisions: a many player coordination
game between a haven country and its potential investors. Investors must anticipate cor-
responding reactions when making the decision as to whether or not to locate their assets
in a haven country. Strategic complementarities between a haven country and investors
as well as among investors play a crucial role and suggest a multiplicity of equilibrium
outcomes.
Accounting for the incomplete information that investors typically face, we derive an
endogenous cost limit of operating as a tax haven above which a haven country will comply
with an exchange of tax information, and below which it will pursue a secrecy regime.
Notably, this cost limit lies below the potential revenues for an active tax haven. So there
are circumstances for which the equilibrium predicts a transparency regime although an
active tax haven could yield positive prots. In these situations, a coordination failure
precludes a secrecy regime and explains why a haven country might be compliant despite
the positive returns on operating as a tax haven.
Furthermore, we derive policy implications. First, we nd an inherent trade-o¤ be-
tween the ght against tax havens and high tax rates, for example, in the course of an
international tax harmonization. Second, low penalties for disclosed o¤shore tax evasion
not only make it attractive for investors to evade taxes, but also render haven countries
resistant against costly pressure. Third, we give insights into the pricing of services in tax
havens and explain why positive service fees need not be competed away in a competitive,
international nancial market with multiple active tax havens. Large prots make haven
countries robust toward international initiatives and therefore trustworthy for investors.
2The deterrence e¤ect of whistleblowing: An event
study of leaked customer information from banks in
tax havens
This chapter is based on joint work with Niels Johannesen.1
2.1 Introduction
In the digital age, whistleblowing scandals have become the order of the day. Anyone
holding condential information can easily make it available to the rest of the world by
posting it online, and organizations likeWikiLeaks have specialized in receiving, process-
ing, and disseminating leaked information.
Whistleblowers are celebrated as the heroes of our timewho are contributing to
ethics and integrity (UN 2016) and whose legal protection is considered an important
concern for public policy.2 These views presume that whistleblowing does not merely lead
to sanctions against the individuals and companies whose illegal or immoral actions are
exposed, but a¤ects and improves behavior more broadly. This view is consistent with
standard economic theories of crime (Becker 1968), in which whistleblowing should act
as a deterrent of criminal behavior by increasing the likelihood of involuntary exposure
and, thus, of legal as well as other social sanctions.
Concretely, we should expect that athletes were deterred from using illicit drugs when
whistleblower Yuliya Stepanova revealed the existence of a large-scale Russian doping
program, which led to the exclusion of hundreds of athletes from the 2016 Olympic
Games; that radical islamists became less inclined to join the army of the Islamic State
when the former insider Abu Hamed exposed the identities of 22,000 secretly enlisted
jihadis; and that rms became more compliant with environmental laws when leaked
1See Johannesen and Stolper (2017).
2See Corporate crime: The age of the whistleblower, The Economist, 5 December 2015.
32 2. The deterrence e¤ect of whistleblowing
reports documented the dumping of toxic waste by the Dutch multinational trading
company Tragura.
This study provides empirical evidence on the deterrence e¤ect of whistleblowing in
the context of o¤shore tax evasion. Specically, we investigate whether leaks of customer
information from banks in tax havens have deterred the criminal use of o¤shore banking
services. While bank accounts in tax havens are not illegal per se, they often serve to
evade taxes, which makes account holders and sometimes also the bankers assisting with
the tax evasion liable to criminal prosecution.3 Hence, for owners of tax haven accounts
as well as for bankers in tax havens, leaks of customer les involve a risk of legal sanctions
if the information is acquired by tax authorities, and public humiliation if posted online.
The key empirical challenge is that the criminal use of o¤shore banking services is
not directly observable. Our main empirical approach is therefore indirect and amounts
to estimating the e¤ect of data leaks on the stock prices of banks that provide such
services. Stock prices reect the net present value of expected future prots given all
available information (Fama 1991); hence, if we observe a drop in the stock prices of
these banks precisely at the time when customer information is leaked, this is plausibly
because nancial markets expected the prots associated with criminal o¤shore services
to decrease. Intuitively, a decrease in prots could derive from either the demand side or
the supply side of the o¤shore banking market with account holders or bankers perceiving
the participation in tax evasion to be more risky.4
For the purposes of this analysis, we carefully select a sample of o¤shore banks that are
known to have foreign tax evaders among their customers. We start from the full sample of
banks in Switzerland. Although its banking secrecy rules have recently been moderated,
Switzerland dominates the global wealth management industry with a market share of
around 30% (Zucman 2013, p. 1,341). Within this sample, we focus on a subsample of
banks that have admitted to assisting US taxpayers with tax evasion. Starting with the
case against the Swiss bank UBS in 2008, the US government has investigated 16 Swiss
banks for their complicity in tax evasion leading to settlements with a combined value of
more than US $4.29 billion. Subsequently, another 80 Swiss banks have admitted to tax-
related criminal activities in the US under the Swiss Bank Program, which allowed banks
to resolve criminal liabilities through the full disclosure of their cross-border activities
and the payment of appropriate penalties. From this gross sample of 96 Swiss banks with
a known link to o¤shore tax evasion, our estimating sample includes the 46 banks that
are listed on a stock exchange.
3Documents published in the context of a court case against the Swiss bank UBS show that around 90% of the banks
US customers were not tax compliant (US Senate 2008). Besides hundreds of account holders, several UBS bankers were
prosecuted for assisting with tax evasion including the whistleblower, Bradley Birkenfeld, and the head of the banks global
wealth management division, Raoul Weil.
4Alstadsæter et al. (2017) develop a formal model of the supply side of the market for o¤shore services where an exogenous
shock to the risk of detection induces o¤shore banks to shed customers with relatively few assets under management.
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Our main analysis concerns the rst data leak from a tax haven bank: customer les
from LGT Bank in Liechtenstein were extracted by a former computer technician at the
bank, Heinrich Kieber, and distributed to tax authorities in several countries. The leak
became publicly known on 14 February 2008, when German police raided the premises
of Klaus Zumwinkel, the chief executive of Deutsche Post, and detained him on charges
of tax evasion. It soon became clear that the charges were based on leaked customer
les that also contained incriminating information about hundreds of other German tax
evaders. The a¤air attracted global attention and was prominently covered by media such
as The New York Times, Le Monde, Die Welt, and El Pais in the following days.
Employing a standard event study framework (Kothari and Warner 2007), we nd that
the LGT leak caused a signicant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks involved
in o¤shore tax evasion. The banks in our sample tracked the normal return closely in the
ten days preceding the leak, but earned an abnormal return of -1.1% over the rst two
days after the leak and -2.2% over the rst four days following the leak. The estimated
stock market responses are larger and sharper when returns are weighted by market
capitalization; here, we nd an abnormal return of -2.1% over two days and -3% over four
days. In either case, the cumulative abnormal returns are statistically signicant based
on standard parametric tests and also non-parametric tests comparing abnormal returns
after the leak to the empirical distribution of abnormal returns in the pre-leak period.
These ndings are suggestive that the leak from LGT Bank lowered market expecta-
tions about the future earnings of tax haven banks that assist foreign customers with
tax evasion. The most plausible interpretation is that markets perceived the leak as an
e¤ective deterrent of o¤shore tax evasion. Since o¤shore tax evasion had never previously
been exposed in leaks, o¤shore account owners and bankers most likely did not account
for this risk before the leak from LGT Bank.5 Alternatively, they may have assigned a
very small probability to the possibility of a leak and updated their beliefs about this
probability the rst time a leak occurred. In either case, an increase in the perceived
probability of a leak should be expected to deter the demand and supply of criminal
o¤shore banking services and reduce the earnings of o¤shore banks.
A number of additional empirical tests support this interpretation of the main result
and provide further evidence of the mechanisms at play.
First, we show that other Swiss banks than those with known links to o¤shore tax
evasion did not earn abnormal returns in the days after the leak. This reassures us that
our results are not driven by confounding shocks a¤ecting the entire Swiss nancial sector
and is strongly suggestive that the negative abnormal returns earned by banks in the
baseline sample are related to their role in tax evasion.
5Formal models of choice under uncertainty typically assume that decision-makers are aware of all possible outcomes,
but unawareness has been studied theoretically in the literature on bounded rationality (e.g., Dekel et al. 1998).
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Second, we explore the heterogeneity of the stock market responses within the baseline
sample and nd a much larger decrease for the banks that were investigated by US pros-
ecutors (abnormal return of -6.1% over four days) than for the banks that subsequently
resolved their criminal liabilities through a voluntarily disclosure of their cross-border ac-
tivities (abnormal return of -1.2% over four days). Presumably, US prosecutors selected
Swiss banks for investigation based on ex ante information about their involvement in
o¤shore tax evasion, so market participants with a similar information set would plau-
sibly expect the same banks to be most adversely a¤ected by an increase in the risk
associated with o¤shore tax evasion. We obtain similar results with an ex post measure
of the involvement in o¤shore evasion based on the size of the penalties paid to the US.
Specically, we nd a larger decrease for banks with above-median penalties (abnormal
return of -3.2% over four days) than for banks with below-median penalties (abnormal
return of -1.4% over four days). This set of results further strengthens the causal link
between the bankslosses in market value around the time of the LGT leak and their role
in o¤shore tax evasion.
Third, we apply the same event study design to subsequent leaks from other tax haven
banks. We manually searched all front pages of a major Swiss newspaper, Neue Zürcher
Zeitung, between January 2008 and October 2016 and identied 13 instances where an
article covered a newly leaked list of bank customers or a signicant new dissemination of
such a list, for example, when a customer list previously leaked to foreign tax authorities
was made publicly accessible. We generally nd weak signs of stock market responses to
major events, such as the leak from the Swiss wealth management branch of HSBC in
2009, but the e¤ects are relatively modest in size and typically not statistically signicant
at conventional levels. Overall, these results are suggestive that the very rst leak led
o¤shore account owners and bankers to incorporate the risk of whistleblowing into the
calculus of tax evasion whereas subsequent leaks were not associated with a signicant
updating of the beliefs about this risk.
Fourth, we explore the alternative hypothesis that leaks do not themselves deter o¤-
shore tax evasion, but drive down the expected earnings of murky o¤shore banks by
exposing them to unwanted media attention, for instance, because exposure fosters pub-
lic demand for political action. In an attempt to distinguish this exposure hypothesis
from the deterrence hypothesis, we apply our model to an event that made o¤shore tax
evasion feature prominently in international media, but contained no new information
about its potential costs: the investigation against Uli Hoeness, president of the soccer
club FC Bayern Munich, for his use of Swiss bank accounts for tax evasion purposes after
his voluntary self-disclosure was considered incomplete. Consistent with the deterrence
hypothesis, we nd no signicant stock market responses to this event.
Finally, we provide a complementary analysis of the deterrence e¤ect of the LGT data
leak using country-level data on foreign-owned bank deposits from the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements. While foreign-owned deposit stocks evolved very similarly in tax
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havens and non-haven countries before the leak, we observe a sharp divergence during the
rst quarter of 2008 with deposits in tax havens decreasing by more than 10% relative
to deposits in non-tax havens. This estimate is clearly consistent with a signicant drop
in the use of criminal o¤shore banking services following the leak and the magnitude is
similar to what is implied by the drop in market value by the Swiss sample banks under
plausible assumptions about discount rates on nancial markets and prot margins in
the wealth management industry.
While a number of studies have investigated which conditions are conducive to whistle-
blowing (Dyck et al. 2010), we are not aware of any existing quantitative evidence on the
ability of whistleblowing to deter crime. A large related literature with contributions from
scholars in law, economics, and criminology explores the role of transparency and public
information in deterring criminal behavior more broadly. For instance, legal scholars have
argued that the public shaming of criminals is an e¢ cient way to deter white-collar crime
(Kahan and Posner 1999) and economists have documented that publishing individual-
level information about reported taxable income reduces tax evasion (Bo et al. 2015).
Our study also contributes to a small literature investigating the factors that shape
o¤shore tax evasion, for instance, tax rates (Hanlon et al. 2015), tax enforcement (Johan-
nesen and Zucman 2014), and tax amnesties (Johannesen et al. 2017 and Langenmayr
2015). Our results suggest that the emergence of whistleblowers from the ranks of em-
ployees in tax haven banks has the potential to curb o¤shore tax evasion.
Finally, our study adds to an emerging literature studying how stock prices respond to
data leaks and other news about tax aggressive behavior. For instance, ODonovan et al.
(2017) document that rms whose o¤shore a¢ liates were exposed in thePanama Papers
su¤ered signicant losses in market value when the leak was published, and Hanlon and
Slemrod (2009) show a similar pattern around news stories documenting rmsuse of
domestic tax shelters. While these papers are suggestive that media exposure of rms
aggressive tax planning may limit these rms ability to avoid taxes in the future, they
do not provide evidence of a broader deterrence e¤ect extending beyond the specic
taxpayers exposed in the media.
2.2 Background and data
2.2.1 O¤shore tax evasion and Swiss banks
Recent studies estimate that household wealth hidden in tax havens amounts to at least
US $6,000 billion (Zucman 2013). The hidden wealth predominantly belongs to the very
wealthiest households (Alstadsæter et al. 2017) and largely escapes taxation (US Senate
2008).
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Governments wanting to tax the wealth hidden in tax havens have recently enacted a
number of enforcement initiatives: in 2005, the European Union agreed with a number of
tax havens to tax the interest income accruing to accounts owned by European residents
and remit the revenue to the home country (Johannesen 2014); in 2009, all tax havens
in the world were compelled to accept a weak form of cooperation whereby they would
lift the banking secrecy and provide information about specic account holders suspected
of tax evasion when requested by foreign tax administrations (Johannesen and Zucman
2014), and most recently, tax havens agreed to provide nancial account information of
foreign taxpayers on an automatic basis (Stolper 2017).6
An enforcement initiative of particular interest to this study are the criminal cases in
the US against Swiss banks for assisting US citizens with tax fraud involving anonymous
shell companies and undeclared Swiss bank accounts. The rst case, against UBS, ended
with a US $780 million settlement in February 2009, and another 15 Swiss banks were
investigated on similar charges in the following years.7 At the time of writing, six of
these cases had been settled with combined penalties of US $4.29 billion while seven are
still pending, and three of the investigated banks have ceased their operations.8 Finally,
in August 2013, the US Department of Justice and the Swiss government announced
the Swiss Bank Program under which banks not already under criminal investigation
could resolve potential criminal liabilities related to undeclared US-owned accounts in
Switzerland by satisfying a list of requirements, including full disclosure of their cross-
border activities, cooperation with future information requests under the US-Swiss double
tax treaty, and the payment of appropriate penalties. This program resulted in non-
prosecution agreements with an additional 80 banks with combined penalties of around
US $1.36 billion.9
These US enforcement initiatives are useful for our purposes because they identify
a group of banks that derived income from assisting US customers with o¤shore tax
evasion prior to the investigations.10 Upon an increase in the risks associated with o¤shore
tax evasion, we should expect precisely these banks to su¤er a loss in market value.
Moreover, the outcomes of the enforcement initiatives allow us to make predictions about
the heterogeneity in stock market responses within this sample of banks. First, if US
prosecutors chose to investigate the Swiss banks, which they believed ex ante were the
most likely to be involved in o¤shore tax evasion, and if market participants had similar
beliefs, we should expect investigated banks to su¤er larger market value losses than banks
subsequently admitting to criminal o¤ences under the Swiss Bank Program. Second, if
6Account information is provided to the US under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and to other
countries under the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters as amended in 2014.
7There is no o¢ cial list of all 16 banks under investigation, but they are mentioned in numerous news articles.
One article that lists all the banks can be found on the Swiss public service news and information platform Swissinfo,
see http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/credit-suisse-fallout_remaininghit-listbanks-sweat-over-us-verdicts/38637818 (last ac-
cessed on 15 February 2017).
8The three banks that have dropped out of business are Wegelin, Neue Zürcher Bank, and Bank Frey.
9See https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
10Of course, Swiss banks also assist taxpayers from other countries in evading taxes. In fact, most Swiss bank deposits
are owned by Europeans (Zucman 2013, pp.1,332¤).
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ex post penalties contain a signal about the degree of involvement in o¤shore tax evasion
that was at least partly observable by market participants at the time of the leak, we
should expect market value losses to be larger for banks with higher penalties.
Starting from the gross sample of 96 Swiss banks that have been subject to criminal
investigations in the US or have participated in the Swiss Bank Program, we arrive
at the estimating sample in the following steps. First, our empirical approach requires
daily publicly available stock prices, so we disregard banks that are not listed on a stock
exchange. However, when a Swiss bank in our sample belongs to a multinational banking
group, we include the parent company if listed; for instance, the Swiss entity HSBC
Private Bank is owned by the UK-based holding company HSBC Holdings PLC.11 This
procedure yields 49 Swiss entities. Second, we exclude three entities that are classied
neither as a bank nor as a nancial services company under the Industry Classication
Benchmark (ICB) as we do not expect the data leaks to be relevant for these rms. 12
Finally, as particularly smaller entities are not always being traded, we exclude entities for
which no stock return can be identied in the week after the event under consideration.
This yields an estimating sample of 38 Swiss entities for the data leak from LGT Bank in
February 2008 and a similar number of entities for other events. While the sample varies
slightly across events and, strictly speaking, includes both Swiss banks and multinational
banking groups with an o¢ ce in Switzerland, we shall refer to the banks in our sample
as Swiss banksfor simplicity of the exposition.
Table 2.A in the Appendix to this chapter contains detailed information about all 46
banks that appear in the estimating sample at some point between 1 January 2007 and
31 October 2016, including an indication of whether a bank has been subject to criminal
investigations or has participated in the Swiss Bank Program, and the size of the penalty
in the US related to its involvement in o¤shore tax evasion.
2.2.2 Data leaks
The main focus of the analysis is to study banksstock market responses to the leak of cus-
tomer data from the Liechtenstein-based LGT Bank. According to journalistic accounts,
the leak occurred in 2002 when a computer technician at the bank, Heinrich Kieber, ex-
tracted condential customer information from the banks IT systems. After leaving the
bank, he approached the German intelligence agency, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND),
in 2006 and ultimately sold them a CD-ROM with information on the banks customers
in Germany for around e4.2 million.
11The current parent companies of Swiss banks are identied in Bloomberg and any changes to the parent-subsidiary
links are identied in an extensive online research using the banksown homepages, Wikipedia, and http://www.schweizer-
banken.info/ (last accessed on 15 February 2017). In case of multiple listed parent companies on di¤erent hierarchy levels
in the company tree, we selected the lowest ranked listed parent company in order to include as few una¤ected entities as
possible.
12Here, we drop American International Group Inc (insurance), Assicurazioni Generali SpA (insurance) and Italmobiliare
SpA (construction & materials).
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The data leak became publicly known in 2008. After months of secret investigations,
on 14 February, the German policy raided the premises of Klaus Zumwinkel, a prominent
corporate executive, and detained him on charges of tax evasion. The case was immedi-
ately picked up by major media outlets which also reported that the tax evasion scandal
involved hundreds of further suspects. On 15 February, several news media reported that
the German intelligence service was involved in the case and, on 16 February, the German
magazine Der Spiegel was rst to report that the BND had allegedly paid a whistleblower
around e5 million for the information leading to the arrest of Klaus Zumwinkel.13 On 18
February, the news reports contained regular references to the data leak in 2002. While
we treat the arrest of Mr. Zumwinkel on 14 February as the event day, we should not
expect to see the full e¤ect on the stock prices until three to four days after the event,
given the staggered dissemination of information.
While the LGT leak in 2008 was, to our knowledge, the rst data leak from a tax haven
bank, several others followed in the subsequent years. We have systematically collected
information about these leaks by manually searching all front pages of a major Swiss
newspaper, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, for the period between January 2008 and October
2016. Concretely, we searched each front pages for the keywords Steuer (tax), Bank
(bank), Info (information), and Daten (data), and manually screened the headlines
of all articles on the front pages. For every hit, we read the article to determine whether
or not it referred to a data leak from a tax haven.14 Finally, we searched the articles
about data leaks for a reference to the date when the leaks became publicly known; when
an article does not mention any date, we assume that the leak occurred one calendar day
prior to the articles publication date. The implicit assumption underlying this approach
is that data leaks with su¢ cient signicance for Swiss banks to move their stock prices
would be reported on the front pages of Swiss newspapers.
As detailed in Table 2.1, we identied 13 front page articles that concern new data
leaks or signicant new dissemination of information from existing leaks. Several of the
articles reported the major leak from HSBC Private Bank in Switzerland. First, on 30
August 2009, the French budget minister Eric Woerth announced that his ministry was
in possession of a list of 3,000 French taxpayers holding a total of e3 billion in Swiss bank
accounts, but he did not disclose the source of the leak. Then, on 9 December 2009, French
media reported an alleged data theft at HSBC, which was conrmed on 13 December 2009,
when Hervé Falciani revealed himself as the HSBC whistleblower on French prime time
television. Eventually, in February 2015, the International Consortium for Investigative
13See http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/nanzskandal-bnd-zahlte-fuenf-millionen-fuer-geheime-steuerdaten-a-
535687.html (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
14We excluded all articles about the Hildebrand a¤air. Philipp Hildebrand is a former president of the Swiss National
Bank whose wife bought more than half a million US dollars in August 2011, just one month before the Swiss National
Bank capped the exchange rate of the Swiss franc. While the Hildebrand a¤air was triggered by a bank employee leaking
information of this transaction, the data leak was limited to Philipp Hildebrand and was never intended to identify any
foreign tax evaders. A list of all other articles can be requested from the authors.
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TABLE 2.1: Events related to data leaks from tax havens
Event Date of Date of front
number event page article Event
#1 14 feb 2008 16 feb 2008 Head of Deutsche Post was detained on charges of
tax evasion; investigators target hundreds of suspects
and might have obtained data from LGT Bank
#2 30 aug 2009 31 aug 2009 French budget minister announced to possess
data on 3,000 customers of three Swiss banks
#3 - 3 nov 2009 Dutch authorities acquired data from whistleblower
on foreign accounts of alleged Dutch tax evaders
#4 - 10 dec 2009 French media report that an employee of the Swiss
HSBC branch has stolen thousands of customer
les and handed them over to French authorities
#5 1 feb 2010 2 feb 2010 German nance minister announced the acquisition
data that was stolen from a Swiss bank and o¤ered
to German authorities
#6 - 8 feb 2010 Two states in Germany were o¤ered further banking
information on potential tax evaders; it seems likely
that the data will be acquired
#7 17 jan 2011 18 jan 2011 Former employee of Julius Baer, Elmer, publicly
delivered further banking data to WikiLeaks
#8 14 jul 2012 16 jul 2012 German state said to again have acquired banking
information of 1,000 German clients at Coutts
#9 4 apr 2013 5 apr 2013 O¤shore Leaks with information on 130,000
individuals and 122,000 trusts and corporations
hit media headlines around the world
#10 - 17 apr 2013 German authorities have acquired new banking
data from Switzerland and have started raiding
clients of Credit Suisse and its subsidiaries
#11 - 10 feb 2015 Swiss Leaks with information on 100,000 customers
of the Swiss HSBC branch which was stolen by the
former employee Falciani hit international headlines
#12 3 apr 2016 4 apr 2016 Panama Leaks with information on 214,000 shell
companies a¤ecting former and current heads of
states hit the international news headlines
#13 14 apr 2016 15 apr 2016 German state announced to distribute information
from 11 data acquisitions and covering o¤shore
deposits worth CHF 101.6 billion across the EU
Note: The table provides information on all the data leaks from banks in tax havens, and signicant new disseminations
of such data, mentioned on the front page of the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung between 1 January 2008 and 31
October 2016. The date of the event is the date mentioned in the article. The storylines are the authorsown summaries
and translations from German. The front page article on event #8 states that a leak occurred during the weekend of 14/15
July 2012, but not the precise date; however, as the event studies are only concerned with trading days, this has no bearing
on the estimations.
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TABLE 2.2: Summary statistics on stock market returns
Standard
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Individual banks 0.0 2.3 -19.9 25.0
Portfolio of banks, unweighted 0.0 1.2 -8.2 8.9
Portfolio of banks, weighted
by market capitalization
0.0 2.1 -12.1 18.7
Stoxx Europe 600 0.0 1.6 -11.7 11.3
Note: The table provides summary statistics for the stock market returns (in percent) of the 46 Swiss banks in the estimating
sample and for the return of a major European stock market index. All statistics are for the period between 1 January 2007
and 31 October 2016. The rst line refers to the stock returns of individual sample banks; the second to the portfolio return
computed as the simple average of individual bank returns; the third to the portfolio return computed as the average of
individual bank returns weighted by their market capitalization; and the fourth to the stock market index Stoxx Europe
600.
Journalists (ICIJ) gained access to the HSBC customer lists and published them as the
Swiss Leaks, thereby exposing hundreds of prominent tax evaders to public scrutiny.
2.2.3 Stock market data
We use Bloomberg to collect nancial information about the 46 Swiss banks in our esti-
mating sample for the period 1 January 2007 to 31 October 2016. We calculate the daily
return on each stock as the simple rate of return of the stocks total return index, which
accounts for dividends as well as capital gains
Returnn;t =
Pn;t   Pn;t 1
Pn;t 1
, (2.1)
where Pn;t is the value of the total return index of bank n at time t. All prices are denoted
in Swiss francs to avoid any confounding e¤ects of exchange rate movements.
We exclude observations from non-trading days in Switzerland to avoid a small group
of banks which is traded outside of Switzerland from dominating the estimates on specic
days, such as Israeli stocks which are traded on Sundays but not Fridays.15 Moreover,
we exclude observations if the end-of-day stock price remained constant or was missing
for at least ve consecutive Swiss trading days because such stale stocks could otherwise
introduce a bias toward zero. Finally, we winsorize returns at the 0.1 and 99.9% level to
reduce the inuence of outliers.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the resulting sample of stock returns: the
mean daily return across all banks over the entire sample period is 0.0% with a minimum
return of -19.9%, a maximum return of 25%, and a standard deviation of 2.3%. We also
15We dene Swiss trading days as days when the Swiss Market Index is traded. Non-trading days in Switzerland are
typically Saturdays, Sundays, and bank holidays.
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provide summary statistics on the returns of the portfolios including all banks, unweighted
and weighted by market capitalization, as well as a major European broad stock market
index, Stoxx Europe 600.16 In the event studies, we choose this index to proxy for the
general market return because almost all the banks in our sample are listed in Europe and
because it explains more of the variation in stock returns outside of the event windows
than the blue chip index Stoxx Europe 50 or leading Swiss market indices such as the
Swiss Market Index or the Swiss Performance Index.17
2.3 Empirical methodology
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate how the market values of Swiss banks with
ties to o¤shore tax evasion responded to leaks of customer les and other unanticipated
events. For this purpose, we employ a standard event study framework (e.g., Kothari and
Warner 2007).
In a rst step, for each event to be considered, we identify an event-specic sample of
banks and an event-specic observation period. The sample includes all banks, according
to the rules described above, that are a Swiss bank or own subsidiaries that are Swiss
banks for the entire week following the event. The observation period includes the event
window, consisting of the event date and 10 trading days before and after the event
date, and an estimation window consisting of 250 trading days before the event window,
which is roughly one calendar year. So for every analysis, we consider 271 trading days
t 2 [ 260; 10] and the event is normalized to take place on t = 0.
In a second step, we calculate the daily portfolio return as the average daily stock
return across all Swiss banks in the event-specic sample
Portfolio returnt =
1
N
NX
n=1
Returnn;t, (2.2)
where Returnn;t is the return of bank n on day t and N is the number of banks in the
event-specic sample. We use the portfolio return rather than bank individual returns as
the dependent variable in the event study regressions to account for any cross-sectional
dependence in the returns of individual banks.
16To be precise, Table 2.2 uses an unbalanced portfolio accounting for the trading day specic company structures and
ownership links, which sometimes change over time. The event study regressions use event-specic balanced portfolios of
those listed companies that are a Swiss bank or own subsidiaries that are Swiss banks for the entire week following the
event.
17These results are not reported.
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In a third step, we regress the portfolio return on the market return and dummies for
the symmetric 21-day window around the event
Portfolio returnt =  +  Market returnt +
10X
s= 10
sDs + "t, (2.3)
whereMarket returnt is the return of the Stoxx Europe 600 on day t, and Dt is a dummy
indicating day t.
The parameter  captures the correlation between the portfolio return and the market
return in the period before the event window, and the term  +  Market returnt thus
expresses the normal portfolio return on day t conditional on the market return and
absent the leak. The parameter t captures the abnormal return of the portfolio on day t,
AR (t), which is simply the di¤erence between the actual and the normal portfolio return.
The main parameter of interest is the cumulative abnormal return over the rst T days
after the event, CAR (T ), where T = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5. The point estimate can be obtained
directly from the coe¢ cients estimated in equation (2.3) as
CAR (T ) =
T 1X
s=0
s. (2.4)
In practice, we estimate a slightly modied version of equation (2.3) that yields point es-
timates and standard errors of CAR (T ) directly and corrects for potential intertemporal
correlation in the error terms (Salinger 1992).
2.4 Results: Stock prices
2.4.1 Average e¤ect
We start the empirical analysis by estimating the event study model on the baseline
sample of Swiss banks that have either been under criminal investigation for their role in
o¤shore tax evasion or participated in the Swiss Bank Program.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, these banks earned abnormal returns of around -0.5%
on the rst day of the LGT leak and on each of the subsequent three trading days.
The cumulative abnormal return of around -2% over four trading days is statistically
signicant and remained roughly constant in the remainder of the event window. By
contrast, abnormal returns were small and not systematically positive or negative in the
ten days before the leak. This reassures us that the negative abnormal returns observed
after the leak were not driven by a di¤erential underlying trend.
2.4 Results: Stock prices 43
FIGURE 2.1: Cumulative abnormal return of Swiss banks
around the leak from LGT Bank
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Note: The gure illustrates the results from the main event study specication applied to the rst event, the leak from LGT
Bank on 14 February 2008. The line shows the estimates of the cumulative abnormal return. The gray bars indicate 95%
condence intervals of the estimates accounting for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the abnormal returns.
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While the condence intervals plotted in Figure 2.1 are derived under the usual para-
metric assumptions, we also take a non-parametric approach to statistical inference. For
instance, to test the statistical signicance of CAR (5), we compute the cumulative ab-
normal return for each ve-day window in the estimation period (outside of the event
window) and plot the empirical distribution as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Intuitively, this
distribution provides a sense of the variability of abnormal returns in normal times and
thus allows us to assess whether the abnormal return observed at the time of the leak is
statistically signicant. Specically, as illustrated with a vertical line in the gure, our
estimate of CAR (5) is around -2.1%, which corresponds roughly to the 1st percentile in
the distribution. It follows that the probability of observing a more extreme outcome than
CAR (5) under the pre-event distribution of returns is around 2%. Or in other words,
the p-value associated with a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that CAR (5) = 0 is
around 0.02. Applying the same non-parametric test, we nd that CAR (1) is signicantly
di¤erent from zero with a p-value of 0.14, CAR (2) with a p-value of 0.06, CAR (3) with
a p-value of 0.02, and CAR (4) with a p-value of 0.00.
Table 2.3 reports additional results with Column (1) showing the baseline estimates
from Figure 2.1 for ease of comparison. While the baseline specication denes the port-
folio return as the simple average of the individual banksstock returns, we re-estimate
the model with a portfolio return that weighs the individual bank returns by market cap-
italization and report the results in Column (2).18 The estimated stock market responses
are both larger and sharper than in the baseline model with the cumulative abnormal
return reaching -2% already after two days and stabilizing at roughly -3% after four days.
These results are instructive by providing a sense of the economic signicance of the
stock market responses: the combined market value of the 37 banks in the weighted port-
folio was almost CHF 1,000 billion (around US $900 billion) immediately prior to the
leak, so the 3% decrease corresponds to a loss in market value of around CHF 30 billion
(around US $27 billion). Taken at face value, this measures the net present value of the
income losses su¤ered by Swiss banks due to the deterrence e¤ect of the data leak. Assum-
ing that Swiss banks earn an annual prot margin of 0.5% on assets under management
and that stock market investors use a discount factor of 5%, these estimates suggest that
the foreign-owned assets managed by Swiss banks in the portfolio are expected to per-
manently decrease by around CHF 300 billion (around US $270 billion).19 This decrease
corresponds to around 10% of the total foreign-owned wealth managed in Switzerland.20
18We use the latest available pre-event information on banksmarket capitalization so that the weights are una¤ected
by the leak. For four banks there is no available information on pre-event market capitalization (see Table 2.A in the
Appendix), and these banks are therefore not included in the estimation.
19Note that these gures only account for assets held in listed Swiss banks. Assuming that customers in unlisted Swiss
banks were deterred to the same extent as customers in listed Swiss banks and that penalties were proportional to the
value of foreign-owned assets under management, the implied decrease in assets under management is around CHF 190
billion (around $170 billion) or around 7% of the total foreign-owned assets managed in Switzerland.
20Zucman (2013, Table A.23 and A.24) puts the foreign-owned wealth held in Switzerland by the end of 2007 at US $3.4
trillion.
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FIGURE 2.2: Distribution of ve-day cumulative abnormal returns
before the leak from LGT Bank
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Note: The gure illustrates the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns for all ve-day windows in the estimation
period (outside of the event window) of the rst event, the leak from LGT Bank on 14 February 2008. The vertical line
indicates the estimated cumulative abnormal return in a ve-day window starting at the time of the rst leak, that is
CAR(5).
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TABLE 2.3: Main regression results
Unweighted portfolio Weighted portfolio Other Swiss banks
(1) (2) (3)
CAR 1 -0.5 -1.1* -0.3
(0.4) (0.6) (0.7)
CAR 2 -1.1** -2.1** 0.7
(0.5) (0.8) (1.1)
CAR 3 -1.5** -2.2** -0.6
(0.6) (1.0) (1.3)
CAR 4 -2.2*** -3.0** 0.1
(0.7) (1.2) (1.5)
CAR 5 -2.1** -2.9** -0.3
(0.8) (1.3) (1.7)
Stoxx Europe 600 66.5*** 108.2*** 65.0***
(1.7) (2.7) (3.5)
Constant -0.0 -0.0 0.1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Observations 271 271 271
R-squared 0.9 0.9 0.6
Banks in sample 38 37 7
Market capitalization 980,402 980,402 26,977
Note: The table shows the results (in percent) from the main event study specication applied to the rst event, the leak
from LGT Bank on 14 February 2008. Column (1) indicates the results with the unweighted portfolio return; Column (2)
indicates the results with the portfolio return weighted by market capitalization; Column (3) indicates the results for an
unweighted portfolio of Swiss banks with no known link to o¤shore tax evasion. All regressions include a set of event time
dummies as described in the main text. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and take account for cross-sectional
and intertemporal correlation in the abnormal returns. *** Signicant at the 1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, and
* signicant at the 10% level.
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Having established an economically sizable and statistically signicant decrease in the
market value of Swiss banks associated with o¤shore tax evasion precisely at the time
of the LGT leak, one may still be concerned that the stock market response was in
fact not caused by the leak itself but by an unrelated shock coinciding with the leak.
We address this concern by applying the baseline model to a sample of Swiss banks
not associated with o¤shore evasion.21 For most types of shocks unrelated to o¤shore
evasion, for instance, monetary policy changes, macroeconomic news, and exchange rate
uctuations, we should expect the two groups of banks to be similarly a¤ected and, thus,
stock prices to follow similar patterns. However, as shown in Column (3), there is no clear
trend in the abnormal returns earned by banks not associated with o¤shore evasion after
the leak: the cumulative abnormal return in this group was 0.7% after two days and 0.1%
after four days. These results are strongly suggestive that the responses identied in the
main sample are in fact caused by the leak.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous e¤ects
This section explores how stock market responses to the leak from LGT Bank varied
within the estimating sample across Swiss banks with di¤erent involvement in o¤shore
tax evasion. We exploit two distinct measures of involvement.
Most importantly, we distinguish between the eight banks that were investigated by
US authorities for complicity in tax crimes and the 30 banks that subsequently disclosed
their cross-border activities under the Swiss Bank Program. Assuming that US authorities
selected Swiss banks for prosecution based on ex ante information about their involvement
in o¤shore tax evasion and further assuming that market participants had access to a
similar information set, we should expect the stock prices of prosecuted banks to be
most adversely a¤ected by a general drop in the demand for o¤shore nancial services
triggered by the leak. We estimate the baseline model for the two subsamples separately
and plot the results in Figure 2.3. The results are strikingly di¤erent: the cumulative
abnormal return after four days was -6.1% for the prosecuted banks, but only -1.2% for
the voluntary disclosers.
Table 2.4 reports additional results with Columns (1)(2) showing the estimates from
Figure 2.3 for ease of comparison. Columns (3)(4) show that a similar pattern prevails if
bank returns are weighted by market capitalization in the portfolio return, although the
di¤erence between the two groups of banks is less stark: the cumulative abnormal return
after four days was -4.6% for the prosecuted banks and -2.1% for the voluntary disclosers.
Ultimately, the involvement of Swiss banks in o¤shore tax evasion should be reected
in the size of the penalties paid in the US. We thus split the sample of banks on the size
21We identied this set of placebo banks in the equity screen of Bloomberg. Specically, we searched for all actively
traded banks and asset managers in Switzerland, and excluded all banks that were investigated in the US for assisting in
o¤shore tax evasion or participated in the Swiss Bank Program.
48 2. The deterrence e¤ect of whistleblowing
FIGURE 2.3: Heterogeneity in the cumulative abnormal returns of Swiss banks
around the leak from LGT Bank
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Note: The gure illustrates the results from the main event study specication applied to the rst event, the leak from LGT
Bank on 14 February 2008. The two lines show the estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of Swiss
banks that were subjected to criminal investigations in the US for their role in o¤shore tax evasion (solid) and the sample
of Swiss banks that admitted to criminal tax-related o¤ences under the Swiss Bank Program (dash), respectively. The gray
bars indicate 95% condence intervals of the estimates accounting for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the
abnormal returns.
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of the penalties and estimate the baseline model for the two subsamples separately. As
shown in Columns (5)(6) of Table 2.4, the stock market responses to the rst leak are
stronger for banks with larger ex post penalties: the cumulative abnormal return after
four days was -3.2% for banks with above-median penalties and -1.4% for those with
below-median penalties. As shown in Columns (7)(8), a similar pattern emerges when
bank returns are weighted by market capitalization in the portfolio return.
By showing that bankslosses in market value around the time of the LGT leak vary
systematically with the intensity of their involvement in o¤shore tax evasion, these re-
sults further establish the causal link between the leak and the observed decrease in
stock prices; it is highly unlikely that heterogeneity in this particular dimension would
have emerged if the correlation was spurious and stock markets really responded to a
simultaneous shock unrelated to o¤shore evasion.
2.4.3 Other events
This section studies the stock market responses to events other than the leak from LGT
Bank with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanism by which whistle-
blowing a¤ected the stock prices of Swiss banks involved in o¤shore tax evasion. The
results are reported in Table 2.5.
We rst apply the baseline model to three key dates associated with the leak of cus-
tomer les from HSBC: 30 August 2009 when Éric Woerth, the French budget minister,
announced that the French government had acquired a list of 3,000 French customers of
three banks in Switzerland with assets worth US $3 billion (Column 1); 9 December 2009
when, for the rst time, French media reported an alleged data theft at HSBC (Column
2); and 9 February 2015 when the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
(ICIJ) announced that they were in possession of the complete set of leaked documents
from HSBC and published the identity of hundreds of prominent customers in a global
wave of news stories (Column 3). We also estimate the average stock market response to
the remaining nine leaks in our database with a modied version of the baseline model
that includes multiple event windows (Column 4).22
The results show that stocks of Swiss banks in the estimating sample generally earned
negative abnormal returns in the days following news about a leak, however, the e¤ects
were relatively modest in size and typically not statistically signicant at conventional
levels. The results are suggestive that the data leaks occurring after the rst leak from
LGT Bank did not cause a signicant reduction in the use of o¤shore bank accounts.
Plausibly, the rst leak made o¤shore account holders and banks aware of the risk that
customer information may be leaked whereas subsequent leaks did not induce any signif-
22The observation period of this modied event study model includes all trading days from one year prior to the event
window of the rst leak until the event window of the last leak. The sample includes all banks that satisfy the requirements
outlined above for all leaks under consideration.
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TABLE 2.5: Regression results, other events
Leak #2: Leak #4: Leak #11:
Woerth Falciani Swiss Leaks Other leaks Hoeness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR 1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
(1.0) (0.8) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5)
CAR 2 -1.1 0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6
(1.4) (1.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.7)
CAR 3 -2.1 -0.7 -1.1* -0.5 -0.5
(1.7) (1.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.9)
CAR 4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6
(1.9) (1.6) (0.7) (0.5) (1.0)
CAR 5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
(2.2) (1.7) (0.7) (0.5) (1.1)
Stoxx Europe 600 73.5*** 81.2*** 62.4*** 78.7*** 71.4***
(2.2) (2.6) (1.6) (1.0) (3.2)
Constant 0.1 0.1** -0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Observations 271 271 271 1,890 271
R-squared 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7
Banks in sample 38 40 36 30 36
Market capitalization 842,491 813,818 668,437 759,968 622,445
Note: The table shows the results (in percent) from the main event study specication applied to various events. Column (1)
concerns leak #2 where the French Budget Minister announced the acquisition of a list with French owners of undeclared
Swiss accounts; Column (2) concerns leak #4 when Hervé Falciani revealed himself as the source of the data leak from HSBC;
Column (3) concerns leak #11 where ICIJ published the HSBC customer lists as the Swiss Leaks; Column (4) concerns
leaks #3, #5#10, and #12#13; Column (5) concerns the date when it became publicly known that Uli Hoeness was
under investigation for o¤shore tax evasion. All regressions include a set of event time dummies as described in the main
text. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and take account for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the
abnormal returns. *** Signicant at the 1% level, ** signicant at the 5% level, and * signicant at the 10% level.
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icant upward adjustment in the probabilities assigned to such events. Prior to the rst
leak, they may have believed that data theft from Swiss banks was impossible; that bank
employees had no incentive to blow the whistle or that intelligence services and tax au-
thorities were not able or willing to use leaked data to prosecute tax evaders and bankers.
While the rst leak changed these priors, any e¤ect of subsequent leaks on the perceived
risk appears to be too small to be statistically detectable.
Finally, we apply the baseline model to an event that is entirely unrelated to whistle-
blowing, but received enormous attention in international media: 20 April 2013 when it
became apparent that Uli Hoeness, president of the soccer club FC Bayern Munich and
a prominent public person with contacts to high-level politicians including the German
chancellor Angela Merkel, was under investigation for tax evasion through accounts in
Swiss banks.23 As shown in Column (5), banks in the baseline sample earned very small
and statistically insignicant abnormal returns in the days following the news.
This result suggests that media exposure in itself does not decrease the market value
of o¤shore banks. This has important implications for the interpretation of the main
ndings: it is consistent with the notion that the LGT leak decreased the market value of
Swiss banks through the deterrence of o¤shore tax evasion, but not consistent with the
alternative hypothesis that stock markets responded adversely to o¤shore evasion having
caught the attention of media, voters, and, ultimately, policy makers.
2.5 Results: bank deposits
In this section, we study the deterrence e¤ect of the LGT leak by exploiting an entirely
di¤erent data source: the Locational Banking Statistics from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS). This publicly available data source provides information on the stock
of foreign-owned bank deposits in 47 international banking centers including major tax
havens such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
The deposit information in the BIS statistics is reliable because the primary data source
is the banksown balance sheets. To our knowledge, this is the only aggregate statistic
of activities in the wealth management sector which covers all tax havens, and it is
used extensively in the recent literature on hidden wealth (e.g. Andersen et al. 2016,
Johannesen and Zucman 2014, Johannesen 2014, and Zucman 2013).
Our main variable of interest in this analysis is the stock of bank deposits owned by
foreign non-bank residents. This variable excludes inter-bank deposits, which is presum-
ably entirely unrelated to tax evasion, and thus captures deposits held by households and
rms. The main weakness of the measure in this context is the fact that only deposits
are covered whereas other types of assets under management, e.g. bonds and shares, are
23For summaries of the Uli Hoeness case, see Uli, Uli, Uli: Secret Swiss bank accounts suddenly have a famous face,
The Economist, 27 April 2013, and Germanys Hoeness trial: Uli goes to jail, The Economist, 13 March 2014.
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not. Recent estimates suggest that deposits account for around 25% of the total nancial
wealth managed in tax havens (Zucman 2013).
We investigate whether the LGT leak caused a detectable decline in the use of secret
o¤shore accounts by comparing the evolution of deposits in tax havens and non-haven
countries around the time of the leak. Concretely, we dene a list of 17 tax havens,
corresponding roughly to the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions published by the OECD
at the eve of the rst global crackdown on tax havens in 2009 (Johannesen and Zucman
2014, OECD 2009), and dene the remaining countries that report to the BIS statistics
as non-tax havens.24 To be able to meaningfully compare countries with very di¤erent
deposit stocks, we base the analysis on a country-level deposit index expressing the stock
of deposits in a given quarter relative to the stock at the end of the fourth quarter of
2007, 2007q4, the last observation before the data leak.
We rst plot the average index value for tax havens and non-haven countries in a
narrow window around the data leak. As shown in Figure 2.4, deposit stocks evolved very
similarly in the two groups before the data leak with steady quarterly increases. Between
the end of 2007q4 and the end of 2008q1, however, we observe a sharp divergence with
a continued strong deposit growth in non-haven countries, and a close to zero growth
in tax havens. The level di¤erence of between 10 and 15 index points remains roughly
constant through the bust of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the onset of the
global nancial crisis in 2008q3.
Next, for the purposes of statistical inference, we run a simple linear regression with the
deposit index as dependent variable and a tax haven dummy, a full set of time dummies,
and their interactions as explanatory variables. Figure 2.5 plots the estimated coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms as well as their condence intervals, based on standard errors
clustered at the country-level, and shows that the divergence in 2008q1 and 2008q2 is
strongly statistically signicant.
Under the identifying assumption that deposits held by foreign rms and households
would have evolved similarly in tax havens and non-haven countries in the absence of the
leak of customer information from LGT Bank, the results suggest that the leak caused a
sudden decrease in the deposits held in tax havens by around 10 to 15%. The decrease
is consistent with the notion that the rst data leak reduced the use of o¤shore bank
accounts by increasing the risk of involuntary exposure as perceived by account holders
and banks. Note that the magnitude of the estimate is similar to what is implied by
the estimated drop in market value of the Swiss sample banks, as shown above, under
24Our list comprises the following countries: Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Cayman Islands, Curacao, Cyprus,
Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland.
These are all on the list of jurisdictions that had not implemented the global standard of international cooperation in tax
matters published by the OECD prior to the G20 summit in April 2009 except for Macao and Hong Kong, which were
omitted from the OECD list due to political pressure from China (see G20 declares door shut on tax havens, The
Guardian, 2 April 2009).
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FIGURE 2.4: Foreign-owned deposits in tax havens and non-haven countries
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Note: The gure illustrates the trend in foreign-owned bank deposits in tax havens and non-haven countries respectively.
For each country reporting to the BIS Locational Banking Statistics,we computed a country-level deposit index expressing
the stock of deposits in a given quarter relative to the stock at the end of the fourth quarter of 2007. The two lines show
the average index value for tax havens (solid) and non-haven countries (dash) for the period 2006q4 to 2008q3.
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FIGURE 2.5: Estimated e¤ect of the LGT leak on deposits in tax havens
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Note: The gure illustrates the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of the LGT leak on foreign-owned bank
deposits in tax havens. For each country reporting to the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, we rst computed a country-
level deposit index expressing the stock of deposits in a given quarter relative to the stock at the end of the fourth quarter
of 2007. We estimated a linear regression model with the index as dependent variable and time dummies, a haven dummy,
and the interactions between them as explanatory variables. The line shows the estimates for the interaction terms. The
gray bars indicate 95% condence intervals of the estimates based on standard errors clustered at the country level.
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plausible assumptions about discount rates on nancial markets and prot margins in
the wealth management industry.
2.6 Concluding remarks
While whistleblowing has become the order of the day in politics, business, sports, and
many other domains of society, we know little about its consequences. Some argue that it
deters criminal activity by increasing the risk of exposure, but, to our knowledge, there
is no systematic evidence documenting such an e¤ect.
This chapter studies whistleblowing in the context of o¤shore tax evasion and an en-
vironment in which data leaks were thought to be impossible or at least very unlikely. It
documents that the rst leak of customer les from a tax haven bank caused a signicant
decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to derive revenues from o¤shore tax
evasion. Our preferred interpretation is that the leak induced a shock to the detection risk
as perceived by o¤shore account holders and banks, which curbed the use of o¤shore bank
accounts and ultimately lowered the expected future prots of banks providing access to
such tax evasion technologies.
We address other possible interpretations, for instance, that the negative stock market
responses were driven solely by the media attention to the business model of o¤shore
banks. However, such interpretations are less plausible given that we nd no stock market
responses to other events covered intensively in international media and directly related
to o¤shore tax evasion, but carrying no new information about the risk of exposure for
o¤shore account owners and banks.
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3A step change in tax transparency? An event study
on how the automatic exchange of information did
not a¤ect Swiss banks
3.1 Introduction
The wealth management business in tax havens is currently experiencing fundamental
change. For decades strict banking secrecies have concealed who owns the o¤shore wealth
in tax havens and what income they derive from it. This environment has given rise to
ourishing banking industries attracting many international customers, of whom many
are believed to evade taxation in their home countries. As of 2018, more than one hundred
countries have committed to exchanging nancial account information for tax purposes
on an automatic basis, including many of the countries that were previously renowned
for their banking secrecies.1
The country which is possibly best known for its banking secrecy, and which is the
world market leader for o¤shore wealth management, is Switzerland. It entrenched its
banking secrecy into law in 1934, making it a criminal act to reveal the identity of a bank
customer. Information on nancial accounts and their owners could only be obtained
with the subpoena by a Swiss judge in cases of severe criminal acts. Tax evasion, simply
through the non-reporting of taxable income, is considered merely a misdemeanor, and
not a criminal o¤ense. Zucman (2013, 2014) estimates that 8% of the global nancial
wealth of households is held in tax havens, about one third thereof or, equivalently by
the end of 2013, US $2.4 trillion in Switzerland.2 He also estimates that 80% of the
European-owned wealth in Switzerland goes untaxed.3
1For a list of all jurisdictions that have committed to implementing the automatic exchange of nancial account infor-
mation (AEoI), see http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
2Zucmans estimates are smaller than other, non-academic estimates. In an industry survey, The Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) (2014, p. 9f) estimates the global o¤shore wealth by private individuals at US $8.9 trillion by the end of
2013, of which US $2.3 trillion were held in Switzerland.
3A report by the US Senate (2014, p. 61) estimates that, until 2008, between 85 and 95% of the US-linked accounts
with Credit Suisse in Switzerland had been undeclared to US authorities.
62 3. A step change in tax transparency?
On 6 May 2014, Switzerland joined the declaration on the automatic exchange of
information in tax matters (AEoI) by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD 2014) and committed to the implementation of the information
exchange by 2018.4 According to the AEoI, countries will obtain information from their
nancial institutions on nancial accounts held by foreign investors and will automatically
exchange that information with the investorsparticipating home countries. In order to
prevent taxpayers from bypassing the new information exchange, the reporting standard
was designed with a particularly wide scope the information to be exchanged includes
broad types of investment income, account balances, and sales proceeds from nancial
assets; the nancial institutions required to report include banks, custodians, and certain
investment vehicles; and the accounts to be reported include not only accounts held
by individuals but also accounts held by entities, such as trusts and foundations. The
reporting standard also requires to look through passive entities so as to identify the
ultimate owner in control of an account. The OECD calls the implementation of the
AEoI as the new global standard another step change in international tax transparency
(OECD 2013). On the contrary, Knobel (2015) points out signicant loopholes in the
reporting standard. Most prominently, he reports that tax evaders can circumvent the
new information exchange by acquiring sham residency certicates or by setting up a
cleverly designed trust structure in the US.
This study provides the rst empirical evidence on the impact of the automatic informa-
tion exchange on the extent of o¤shore tax evasion in Swiss banks. Providing compelling
evidence comes with two major challenges. First, the extent of o¤shore tax evasion is
inherently di¢ cult to observe.5 Second, the time span between Switzerlands agreement
to the new transparency and the rst time the country will collect information on foreign
account owners includes 2.5 years. It is therefore not clear when exactly banks and their
customers would react to the new legal environment. This study applies a standard event
study approach to analyze how the stock prices of banks in Switzerland reacted to news
concerning the AEoI. This approach has two major advantages. First, stock prices are
publicly available. Second, they capture the net present value of a rms expected future
prots. In an e¢ cient market, any new information that interferes with a rms future
protability will be immediately reected in the stock price (Fama 1991). If nancial mar-
kets expect the AEoI to contract the market for evasion-related banking services, this will
also most likely reduce the future earnings of Swiss banks and should be reected by a
decrease in their stock prices within a few trading days after it became more likely that
Switzerland would participate in the AEoI.
4Note that Switzerland participates in the international exchange of nancial account information on request since 2009,
as studied in by Johannesen and Zucman (2014). Furthermore, nancial account information is provided on an automatic
basis to the US pursuant to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) as amended in 2010. Nevertheless, the
o¤shore wealth in Switzerland is close to an all-time-high (Zucman 2014, pp. 140f).
5Slemrod (2016, pp. 11f) reviews recent work on tax compliance and enforcement, and notes that almost all empirical
analyses on tax evasion rely on indirect measures of evasion.
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The events that made the participation of Switzerland in the AEoI more likely were
identied by systematically screening all front pages of Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), a
leading newspaper in Switzerland. Any event that is important enough to a¤ect the stock
prices of Swiss banks is expected to appear on the front pages of Swiss newspapers. For
the period January 2013 to October 2016, the screening identied 44 articles on the front
pages of NZZ mentioning the AEoI. The main focus of the study is 6 May 2014, when
Switzerland joined the OECD declaration committing to implement the AEoI by 2018.
The following day, the NZZ headline declared farewell to banking secrecy.Furthermore,
the analysis addresses important events prior to that date which may have signaled the in-
creasing political pressure on Switzerland and the countrys changing attitude toward the
AEoI. It also addresses an important event after that date which substantiated the actual
implementation of the information exchange. Finally, the study provides an aggregated
analysis of all 44 front page articles referring the AEoI.
Of course, not every bank in Switzerland engages in and benets from the tax evasion
of its foreign customers. The analysis therefore considers a sample of banks that were
identied by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) for having assisted US customers with
o¤shore tax evasion. The rst bank that faced criminal investigations in the US for its
involvement in o¤shore tax evasion schemes was UBS in 2008. In the subsequent years,
another 15 Swiss banks were subjected to criminal proceedings by the US. Ultimately,
the US DoJ announced the Swiss Bank Program, in which banks could resolve their
potential criminal liability if they fully disclosed their US cross-border activities and paid
appropriate penalties. This program was used by a further 80 Swiss banks. By the time
of writing, the vast majority of legal proceedings has been settled and produced penalties
in the amount of US $5.65 billion.6 After restricting the attention to listed banks with
regular stock returns, the estimating sample for 6 May 2016 includes 37 banks with a
known link to the o¤shore tax evasion business. The sample varies slightly over time
because the ownership structures of banks sometimes change.
The event study specication regresses the return of the portfolio of Swiss banks on a
major European stock market index and dummies indicating the days around important
events concerning the AEoI. The European stock market index controls for normal or
expected returns due to variations in the general market conditions. The main variables
of interest are the dummies, which measure the daily abnormal returns in the stock
prices of Swiss banks. By studying the return series of one portfolio instead of many
individual stock return series, the analysis accounts for any cross-sectional correlation
between the banksstock returns. Moreover, the dummies are specied so as to account
for any intertemporal correlation in the estimated abnormal returns.
6For more information on the legal proceedings, see https://www.justice.gov/tax/o¤shore-compliance-initiative, and for
more information on the Swiss Bank Program, see https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (last accessed on 15
February 2017).
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The results suggest that Switzerlands commitment to implementing the AEoI was
followed by a modest negative return in the stock prices of Swiss banks, which was
limited to a small number of banks. The cumulative abnormal return over four days was
as small as -0.2% for the entire sample of Swiss banks and -0.7% for those Swiss banks
that were subject to individual investigations in the US. Both estimates are statistically
not di¤erent from zero for conventional signicance levels. That is although the standard
errors are moderately sized and the resulting minimum detectable e¤ect sizes are well
below the estimates of a similar event study on data leaks from banks in tax havens
(Johannesen and Stolper 2017). This suggests that the null results are not a consequence
of low statistical power, but rather that they are caused by a lack of e¤ect. The null
results are also robust for further selected events that might have a¤ected the nancial
market expectations. Finally, of the total of 44 NZZ front page articles with a reference
to the AEoI, only two were followed by a sizeable abnormal drop in the stock prices
of Swiss banks. However, the exact timing and the close similarity with the abnormal
performance of the Swiss Market Index, a major index for the entire Swiss stock market,
suggest that the stock price drops might have been driven by factors other than the new
tax transparency.
These ndings are suggestive that nancial markets expected the AEoI to have no
sizeable impact on the future prots of Swiss banks. This does not necessarily imply that
the AEoI had no e¤ect on o¤shore tax evasion. Previously tax non-compliant customers
may become compliant and still keep their assets with banks in Switzerland. However, I
am not aware of any evidence suggesting that funds in Swiss banks have been disclosed
to foreign tax authorities in a similar amount like the o¤shore wealth in Switzerland that
was estimated to go untaxed by the end of 2013 around US $2 trillion. It seems also
unlikely that the entire undeclared o¤shore wealth in Swiss banks becomes tax compliant
and remains in Switzerland. A more plausible explanation seems to be that the market
for evasion-related banking services remained una¤ected, and that the AEoI might not
have increased the level of tax compliance among the owners of Swiss bank accounts.
To my knowledge, this study is the rst to provide empirical evidence on the e¤ect of the
automatic exchange of information on o¤shore tax evasion. It contributes to the literature
assessing previous policy initiatives in this eld. Johannesen and Zucman (2014), for
example, address the information exchange on request, which was implemented as the
new global standard in 2009. They nd that, rather than repatriating funds, tax evaders
relocate their o¤shore wealth to less compliant tax havens in an attempt to circumvent
the new information exchange. Johannesen (2014) identies similar relocation patterns in
response to the European Savings Directive. The directive was implemented in 2005 and
included an anonymous withholding tax on interest income from countries with banking
secrecies. The Savings Directive has also been studied by Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme
(2009) and Klautke and Weichenrieder (2010) with no evidence on an increase in the
level of tax compliance. Langenmayr (2015) shows that programs with reduced penalties
for tax evaders who voluntarily disclose their o¤shore assets increase the extent of evasion,
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but also increase tax revenues net of administrative costs by tax authorities. Finally, in a
similar event study to this one, Johannesen and Stolper (2017) provide evidence that the
acquisition of stolen customer les from banks in tax havens by authorities in high-tax
countries did reduce the hidden wealth in Switzerland.
Furthermore, as an empirical evaluation of a policy initiative, this study is closely
related to the theoretical literature on how policy initiatives should be designed to e¤ec-
tively reduce o¤shore tax evasion. Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) argue for a simultaneous
approach against all tax havens rather than addressing one haven after the other. In a
sequential approach, the fewer active tax havens there are, the more market power they
concentrate. The last tax havens are therefore very protable and resilient against political
pressure from the international community. Konrad and Stolper (2016) identify strategic
complementarities in the compliance decisions of a haven country and many individual
tax evaders. Whether or not the ght against tax havens will be successful is therefore
determined in a many-player coordination game. Their analysis highlights a trade-o¤
between the ght against tax havens and high tax rates or, similarly, low penalties for
revealed tax evasion. Finally, Dharmapala (2016) argues that an information exchange
regime can increase evasion by increasing the costs of tax compliance.
3.2 Background and data
3.2.1 Important milestones toward the AEoI
The study tracks the development from Switzerlands banking secrecy to the new global
standard of tax transparency as captured on the front pages of the leading Swiss news-
paper Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ).7 The underlying reasoning is to use the front page
of NZZ as a proxy for important events in and concerning Switzerland. As the banking
secrecy was long considered to be part of Switzerlands national identity and as an au-
tomatic exchange of information (AEoI) stands in strong conict with it, any important
step toward the new information exchange is expected to show up on the front pages of
Swiss newspapers. To identify such events, all NZZ front pages between January 2013 and
November 2016 were systematically screened for references to the AEoI. The screening
included a keyword search for steuer(tax), info(information), daten(data), and
bank(bank), and manually reading all headlines on the front pages. The article of every
potential hit was then checked for a reference to the AEoI. Each article was also searched
for an indication of when the event under consideration took place. If an article did not
mention the time of event, it was assumed that it had taken place one calendar day prior
7This is neither to assume that traders who drive market prices read NZZ nor that they read only the front page.
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to the articles date of publication. 8 This approach identied 44 front page articles that
refer to the AEoI.
Most prominently, NZZ headline read farewell to banking secrecy after, on 6 May
2014, Switzerland joined the OECD declaration on the automatic exchange of information
in tax matters. In the declaration, all 34 OECD member countries along with 13 non-
member countries committed to implementing the AEoI (OECD 2014). Because this
declaration was Switzerlands rst o¢ cial conrmation that it would comply with the
new global standard of tax transparency and because NZZ called it the end of the Swiss
banking secrecy on its next days front page, this date is the main focus of the analysis.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that major events prior to Switzerlands commitment
might have indicated the rising international pressure on Switzerland and the countrys
changing attitude toward the AEoI, and made stock markets anticipate the political de-
cision later on. Similarly, the commitment does not yet ensure the actual implementation
of the information exchange. Stock markets might still have been in doubt as to whether
or not Switzerland will live up to its promise. The analysis therefore addresses further
selected events which might have been particularly important for the market expectations
regarding the future of the Swiss banking secrecy. The selected events are listed in Table
3.1.
Events #1#5 account for the potential anticipation e¤ects on stock markets. Luxem-
bourg and Austria are the two countries in the EU that used to have banking secrecies
similar to the one in Switzerland. Their agreements to the AEoI created the necessary
unanimity to adjust EU regulations and induced the EU to increase political pressure
on nearby third countries, such as Switzerland, to also join the new information ex-
change. Also, when the information exchange on request was implemented as the new
global standard in 2009, Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland aligned their strategies
and announced their cooperation on the very same day. The decision of one of the coun-
tries to cooperate might therefore have been interpreted as a signal about the bargaining
power of the two other countries. Moreover, the rst endorsement of the AEoI as the
expected global standard by the G20 countries might have signaled a new international
consensus on the future of tax transparency. Switzerlands willingness to contribute to
the development of the AEoI standard as well as to negotiate on the AEoI with the EU
might have indicated a change in the countrys strategy regarding the new information
exchange. Event #6 concerns Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI and is the main
focus of the analysis. Ultimately, Event #7 concerns the treaty signature for the AEoI
between Switzerland and the EU. Because most of the o¤shore wealth in Switzerland is
owned by Europeans (Zucman 2013, pp. 1,332¤), the exchange of information with the
EU substantiates Switzerlands willingness to cooperate.
8As newspapers merely mention the time of day when events take place, it was assumed that the events happened before
the stock exchanges in Switzerland closed. If an event actually took place after stock markets had closed, the events impact
on the banksstock prices is measured with a delay of one day.
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TABLE 3.1: Important milestones toward the AEoI
Event Date of Date of front
number event page article Event Acronym
#1 10 apr 2013 11 apr 2013 Luxembourg announced the implemen- LUX
tation of the AEoI with the EU as of 2015
#2 - 22 apr 2013 G20 countries endorsed the AEoI G20
as the expected new standard
#3 26 apr 2013 29 apr 2013 Austria announced the approval AUT
of the AEoI with the EU
#4 - 15 jun 2013 Switzerland decided to contribute to the OECD
OECD developing a new global standard
but not to o¤er the AEoI to the EU
#5 18 dec 2013 19 dec 2013 Switzerland passed a mandate for EU I
negotiations on the AEoI with the EU
#6 6 may 2014 7 may 2014 Farewell to banking secrecy: Switzerland Main
joined the OECD declaration and commit-
ted to the implementation of the AEoI
#7 27 may 2015 28 may 2015 Switzerland signed the treaty concerning EU II
the AEoI with the EU
Note: The table provides information on all events that are considered important milestones in the development from
Switzerlands banking secrecy to the automatic exchange of nancial account information (AEoI). The date of event is
the date mentioned in the article, the storylines are the authors own summaries and translations from German, and the
acronyms are used for cross-referencing in Table 3.4.
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Finally, the study also includes an aggregated analysis of all front page articles with a
reference to the AEoI. This ensures that the selection of events above does not disregard
an important milestone in Switzerlands transition to the new tax transparency.
3.2.2 Swiss banks beneting from o¤shore tax evasion
Of course, not every Swiss bank is involved in o¤shore tax evasion schemes, and including
banks that derive no earnings from the evasion business would bias the estimation results
toward zero. In order to limit the focus on a¤ected banks, the analysis considers a sample
of banks that were identied by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) for having assisted
US clients with o¤shore tax evasion.
The rst bank that was identied in 2008 is UBS. When the former customer Igor
Olenico¤was sentenced for evading taxes o¤shore, he blamed his evasion on bad nancial
advice from, among others, his UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld. The bank employee,
when charged with conspiracy to defraud the US of tax payments, cooperated with the
US authorities and pointed them toward systematic tax evasion practices of UBS. The
following legal proceedings against the bank for conspiracy to evade taxes resulted in a
settlement including not only a penalty of US $780 million but also an extensive exchange
of information on 4,450 US customers, including where customers transferred their money
to if they had closed the account in the recent years before the settlement.9
Potentially due to the resulting information from the UBS case, the US authorities
investigated another 15 Swiss banks on similar charges throughout the following years.10
At the time of writing, six of these cases had been settled with combined penalties of
US $4.29 billion, seven are still pending, and three of the investigated banks have ceased
their operations.11 Finally, in August 2013 and in consultation with the Swiss government,
the US DoJ announced the Swiss Bank Program, which allowed Swiss banks not already
under investigation to resolve potential criminal liabilities from their US cross-border
business. A participation in the program required, among others, complete disclosure of
a banks cross-border activities, cooperation with future information requests, and the
payment of appropriate penalties. The last banks in the Swiss Bank Program entered
non-prosecution agreements with the US DoJ in January 2016. In total, the program has
produced non-prosecution agreements for a further 80 Swiss banks and has resulted in
payments of more than US $1.36 billion in penalties.12
9For more information on the settlement between the US DoJ and UBS, see https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-enters-
deferred-prosecution-agreement (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
10To my knowledge, there is no o¢ cial list of all 16 banks under investigation, but they are mentioned in numerous news
articles. One article that lists all the banks can be found on the Swiss public service news and information platform Swissinfo,
see http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/credit-suisse-fallout_remaininghit-listbanks-sweat-over-us-verdicts/38637818 (last ac-
cessed on 15 February 2017).
11The three banks that have gone out of business are Wegelin, Neue Zürcher Bank, and Bank Frey. For more information
on the legal proceedings of the US DoJ against o¤shore tax evaders and the nancial institutions assisting them, see
https://www.justice.gov/tax/o¤shore-compliance-initiative (last accessed on 15 February 2017).
12For more information on the Swiss Bank Program, see https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (last accessed
on 15 February 2017).
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The identication of Swiss banks by the US DoJ comes with two advantages. First,
it yields a sample of banks that are known to derive earnings from the o¤shore tax
evasion of their customers. If the automatic information exchange contracts the market
for evasion-related banking services in Switzerland, the future prots and so also the stock
prices of these banks can be expected to decline.13 Second, the identication allows for
heterogeneity analyses in the cross-section of Swiss banks and thereby for inference on
the subsample of banks that are likely to be most strongly involved in the business with
the o¤shore secrecy. For example, it is possible to distinguish the banks as to the size of
the penalty they paid in the US, and as to whether they were investigated individually
or entered the group resolution program.
Because event studies rely on stock returns, the estimating sample disregards all banks
that are not listed on a stock exchange. Banks can either be listed themselves or have a
listed parent entity for example, the Swiss bank HSBC Private Bank, as identied by
the US DoJ, is a subsidiary of the listed, UK-based company HSBC Holdings PLC.14 This
approach yields 44 entities that are a Swiss bank or own subsidiaries that are Swiss banks
for some period between 2012 and 2016. For simplicity, these companies are referred to as
Swiss banks throughout the chapter, while strictly speaking they also include non-Swiss
companies and other companies than banks. Two of these companies are excluded from
the estimating sample because they are classied neither as a bank nor as a nancial
services provider according to the Industry Classication Benchmark (ICB). A change
in the Swiss banking secrecy is therefore not expected to have a strong impact on their
stock prices.15 This yields an estimating sample of 42 Swiss banks, which are listed in
Table 3.A in the Appendix to this chapter.
3.2.3 Stock market data
All stock market information was downloaded from Bloomberg for the period 1 January
2012 to 31 October 2016. It includes daily stock and index prices as well as banksindustry
classication. As most banks under consideration are listed in Switzerland and their stock
prices are denoted in Swiss francs, all prices were downloaded as denoted in Swiss francs
to alleviate exchange rate e¤ects.
The simple stock return sreturnn;t for bank n on trading day t is derived from the
banks daily total return index, which accounts for all stock earnings including capital
13The prevalence of tax evaders with accounts in Swiss banks might have declined in response to the American and
other enforcement initiatives, but they are unlikely to have vanished completely by May 2014, which is the period of main
interest in this study shortly after the Swiss Bank Program was announced. Furthermore, the enforcement initiatives by
the US targeted US tax evaders and are likely to have mainly reduced their occurrence in Swiss banks. The AEoI targets
tax evaders from almost all other countries.
14The current parent entities of Swiss banks are identied in Bloomberg, and any changes to the parent-subsidiary links
are identied in an extensive online research using the banks own homepages, Wikipedia, and http://www.schweizer-
banken.info/ (last accessed on 15 February 2017). In case of multiple listed parent entities on di¤erent hierarchy levels, the
lowest ranked listed parent entity was chosen in order to include as few una¤ected entities as possible.
15Here, Assicurazioni Generali SpA, an insurance company, and Italmobiliare SpA, a construction and materials company,
are excluded from the estimating sample.
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TABLE 3.2: Summary statistics on stock market returns
Standard
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Individual banks 0.0 1.8 -11.5 11.0
Portfolio of banks 0.0 0.9 -7.6 3.0
Stoxx Europe 600 0.0 1.2 -11.7 4.3
Note: The table provides summary statistics for the stock market returns (in percent) of the 42 Swiss banks in the estimating
sample and of a major European stock market index. All statistics are for the period between 1 January 2012 and 31 October
2016. The rst line refers to the stock returns of individual sample banks; the second line to the portfolio return computed
as the average of individual bank returns; the third line to the stock market index Stoxx Europe 600.
gains and dividend payments. It is calculated as
sreturnn;t =
pn;t   pn;t 
pn;t 
, (3.1)
where pn;t denotes the total return index of bank n on trading day t, and t    denotes
the latest Swiss trading day with a total return index observation for bank n prior to day
t. All observations from non-trading days in Switzerland are excluded to rule out a small
subset of banks, which are listed outside of Switzerland, from dominating the analysis
on such days.16 For example, three banks investigated in the US for their involvement in
o¤shore tax evasion are listed in Israel, where stocks are typically traded from Sunday
through Thursday. Again, for the sake of simplicity, this chapter refers to trading days,
while strictly speaking it considers only trading days in Switzerland.
Furthermore, to ensure that stale stocks which are rarely traded do not bias the esti-
mates toward zero, a banks return observations are excluded from the analysis during
times when the banks end-of-day stock price remained constant or was missing for at
least ve consecutive trading days. Also, to reduce the impact of outliers, stock returns
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1/1,000th of returns.17 Table 3.2 provides summary
statistics of the resulting stock market returns. Across all Swiss banks, the daily stock
returns varied between -11.5% and 11.0%, with a mean of 0.0% and a standard deviation
of 1.8%. Table 3.2 also includes the statistics for an equally weighted portfolio of the
Swiss banks and a major index for the European stock market, the Stoxx Europe 600.18
16Trading days in Switzerland are dened as days when the Swiss Market Index was traded. They typically include
weekdays from Monday through Friday except bank holidays.
17For an event study with similar adjustments of the stock returns, see, e.g., Della Vigna and La Ferrara (2010).
18Precisely speaking, the portfolio in Table 3.2 is an unbalanced portfolio that reects the time-varying parent-subsidiary
links. In contrast, the event study specication considers an event-specic balanced portfolio. Furthermore, the index return
is calculated similarly to the stock returns, ignoring observations from non-trading days in Switzerland.
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3.3 Event study methodology
The e¤ect of the AEoI on the Swiss banks is inferred using a standard event study
specication. 19 It elicits how the stock prices of Swiss banks responded to important
events which made it more likely that Switzerland would exchange information for tax
purposes on an automatic basis. The analysis proceeds in three steps.
The rst step determines an event-specic sample and observation period for each event
under consideration. The sample includes all Swiss banks identied by the US DoJ and
listed in Table 3.A, which are Swiss banks themselves or own subsidiaries which are Swiss
banks for the entire week after the event under consideration, which is when the e¤ect
of main interest is estimated. Furthermore, the sample requires the banks to have at
least one return observation during that week. The observation period includes ve stock
market closures before and after the event, which constitutes the event window, and
250 trading days prior to the event window, which constitutes the estimation window
and depicts roughly one calender year. The period of main interest are the days after
an event, but the event window also includes some days prior to the event to identify
potential anticipation e¤ects. Each event-specic observation period thus includes 260
trading days t 2 f 254; 5g, and t = 1 marks the respective event date. The number
of banks included in each sample varies slightly across events as parent-subsidiary links
sometimes change, and it is included in the regression tables.
The second step compiles the sample banks into a daily rebalanced, equally-weighted
portfolio. By studying the return series of one portfolio instead of many stock return
series of individual banks, the analysis does not require the stock returns of individual
banks to be independent. Rather it takes into account any cross-sectional correlation
between them. This step is particularly important because many unaccounted sources
for variation in the stock prices, such as changes in the general market conditions in
Switzerland, might a¤ect many sample banks similarly and may induce a correlation in
the banksstock returns. The equal weighting of the banks and the daily rebalancing of
the portfolio gives each bank in the sample an equal emphasize when eliciting the e¤ect
size. Note that the simple portfolio return on a given day t is thereby just the average
of the individual stock returns of all sample banks on that day 1
N
PN
n=1 sreturnn;t, where
n 2 f1; :::; Ng is the set of banks included in the event-specic sample with a return
observation on day t. Moreover, to permit for the aggregation of returns over multiple
days, the portfolio return preturnt for day t is calculated as the continuously compounded
return and is given by
preturnt = ln
 
1 +
1
N
NX
n=1
sreturnn;t
!
. (3.2)
19An introduction to the methodology of event studies can be found, e.g., in the textbook by Campbell et al. (1997) and
the handbook article by Kothari and Warner (2007).
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The third step regresses the portfolio return on the return of major index for the
European stock market and dummy variables for each day in the event window. The
main interest concerns the cumulative abnormal return CAR of the portfolio in the event
window, which is dened as the sum of the daily abnormal portfolio returns ARt such
that
CART =
TX
t=1
ARt for 1  T  5 (3.3)
CART =
TX
t=0
ARt for   4  T  0. (3.4)
In order to directly estimate CARs and their correct standard errors, which account for
any intertemporal correlation in the estimated abnormal returns, the dummies in the
event window are specied according to Salinger (1992). The dummy specication uses
the fact that the abnormal return on the event day AR1 is also the cumulative abnormal
return on that day CAR1 = AR1, and that the abnormal returns on subsequent days
ARt for t > 1 can be written as the di¤erence of two cumulative abnormal returns
ARt = CARt  CARt 1. A similar logic applies to the (cumulative) abnormal returns in
the event window prior to the event. The resulting regression equations are
preturnt =  +  mreturnt + "t for t   5 (3.5)
preturn1 =  +  mreturn1 + CAR1 + "1 for t = 1 (3.6)
preturnt =  +  mreturnt + CARt   CARt 1 + "t for t  2, (3.7)
where mreturnt is the continuously compounded return of the Stoxx Europe 600 on day
t and CARv, for 1  v  5, are coe¢ cients of dummy variables that are equal to1 for
t = v, equal to  1 for t = v + 1, and zero otherwise.20 For  4  t  0 the regression
equations are similar to the equations for 1  t  5 with CAR w, for 1  w  5, as
coe¢ cients of dummy variables that are equal to1 for t = 1 w, equal to  1 for t =  w,
and zero otherwise.21
The coe¢ cient reects the correlation of the portfolio return with the return of
the Stoxx Europe 600. So  +  mreturnt captures the expected or normal portfolio
return conditional on the European market return on that day and in the absence of
any particular event a¤ecting Swiss banks. The abnormal return is the actual portfolio
return minus its expected or normal return if there had not been an event. Finally, the
20The Stoxx Europe 600 was chosen to control for general market conditions because almost all sample banks are head-
quartered in Europe and because, in regressions not reported in this dissertation, it explained more of the variation of the
portfolio return than the major European blue chip index Stoxx Europe 50. It also qualies as a control as changes in the
Swiss banking secrecy are unlikely to a¤ect the entire European market. This seems less clear for indices of the Swiss market 
for example, UBS and Credit Suisse alone account for around 10% of the Swiss Market Index. (See the factsheet for the Swiss
Market Index-family, available at https://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/indices/data_centre/shares/smi_en.html, last ac-
cessed on 15 February 2017).
21Note that CAR5 is equal to 1 for t = 5 and zero otherwise, as t = 6 is not included in the observation period. Similarly
CAR 5 is dened to be equal to 1 for t =  4 and zero otherwise.
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coe¢ cientsCART capture the portfolios cumulative abnormal return during the event
window.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI
The main event under consideration took place on 6 May 2014, when Switzerland joined
the declaration of the OECD Council Meeting, in which all 34 OECD member countries
along with 13 non-member countries committed to the implementation of the AEoI. NZZ
reported about the event as the farewell to banking secrecy.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the cumulative abnormal return of Swiss banks immediately before
and after Switzerlands commitment. In the week after the declaration, the stock prices
of Swiss banks experienced a persistently negative yet very small cumulative abnormal
return of between -0.1 and -0.2%. The cumulative abnormal return in the week before
the commitment was not persistently positive or negative and accumulative to +0.1%,
which does not suggest a signicant anticipation e¤ect. Neither the cumulative abnormal
return before nor after the commitment are statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero.
In order to investigate whether the sample of Swiss banks may be too broad and include
too many banks for which the banking secrecy is not important enough such that changes
thereof would move their stock prices, the same event study specication is performed
on two sample splits. The aim is to explore whether or not there exists a subsample of
banks that experienced a sizeable and signicant decrease in their market values after
Switzerland committed to the AEoI.
The rst sample split distinguishes the nine banks that were subjected to criminal
investigations by US authorities and the 28 banks that voluntarily disclosed their US
cross-border activities in the course of the Swiss Bank Program. It is plausible to as-
sume that the US authorities selected Swiss banks for investigation based on ex ante
information about the banks involvement in o¤shore tax evasion schemes. If nancial
market participants had similar information, a contraction in the market for evasion-
related banking services should a¤ect the stock prices of the banks that were investigated
more strongly than those that entered the self-disclosure program.
The second sample split distinguishes the banks according to the penalties that they
ultimately paid in the US. The size of the penalty can be expected to reect a banks
criminal exposure from assisting US customers in tax fraud and can therefore serve as an
ex post measure of a banks involvement in o¤shore tax evasion. Again, a contraction in the
market for evasion-related banking services can be expected to a¤ect banks with higher
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FIGURE 3.1: Cumulative abnormal return of Swiss banks
around Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI
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Note: The gure illustrates the results from the event study specication applied to the event of main interest, Switzerlands
commitment to the automatic exchange of nancial account information (AEoI) at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting
on 6 May 2014. The line shows the estimates of the cumulative abnormal return. The gray bars indicate 95% condence
intervals of the estimates accounting for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the abnormal returns.
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penalties more strongly than banks with smaller penalties.22 Note that both measures
for the banksexposure to o¤shore tax evasion are closely related as the penalties which
were paid by the banks under investigation were typically higher than the penalties paid
by the banks that participated in the resolution program.23
Table 3.3 provides the results from the event study on Switzerlands commitment to the
AEoI for di¤erent subsamples of Swiss banks. The results for the entire sample of Swiss
banks are shown in Column (1) for ease of comparison. With regard to the rst sample
split, Column (2) shows the results for the Swiss banks under investigations in the US, and
Column (3) for the banks that participated in the Swiss Bank Program. The investigated
banks experienced a stronger cumulative abnormal decrease in their stock prices of up
to -0.7% over four days after the commitment, and which were persistently negative.
The banks in the Swiss Bank Program experienced cumulative abnormal variations in
their stock prices between -0.2 and +0.1%. A similar pattern exists for the second sample
split as reported in Columns (4)(5). Stock prices of banks that paid a penalty weakly
above the sample median responded more strongly with a persistently negative cumulative
abnormal return of up to -0.6% over four days after the commitment, while stock prices
of banks that paid a penalty below the sample median responded with a cumulative
abnormal return of between -0.2 and +0.2%. Still, for all subgroups and the entire week
after Switzerland committed to the AEoI, cumulative abnormal returns were statistically
not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The results suggest that the modest abnormal return of the portfolio of all Swiss banks
after Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI was driven by those banks that are most
strongly involved in the o¤shore tax evasion business. However, even for those banks,
independent of how they were dened, the cumulative abnormal return was small and
statistically not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
In order to distinguish between a lack of e¤ect and a lack of statistical power, the
remainder of this section computes and discusses the minimum detectable e¤ect sizes
(MDE) for the cumulative abnormal return over four days, which is when the estimates
are the largest. For a statistical power of 80% and a signicance level of 5%, the MDE
is given by
MDE =    t(1 0:8) + t0:05=2  SE [CAR4 , (3.8)
where t is obtained from a standard t-distribution and SE

[CAR4

is the standard error
of the cumulative abnormal return coe¢ cient. Witht0:2 = 0:84 and t0:025 = 1:97, the
expression simplies to
MDE =  2:81  SE

[CAR4

. (3.9)
22The results are qualitatively similar if the sample is split according to the banks penalties relative to a measure of
their size, such as total assets or market capitalization.
23See Table 3.A in the Appendix to this chapter for information on all the Swiss banks in the estimating sample and the
penalties they paid.
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TABLE 3.3: Regression results for Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI
Criminal Swiss Bank High Low
All investigation Program penalty penalty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR 1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.1
(0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
CAR 2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
(0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (0.6) (0.5)
CAR 3 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.1
(0.5) (0.9) (0.6) (0.7) (0.6)
CAR 4 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 0.2
(0.6) (1.1) (0.6) (0.8) (0.7)
CAR 5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.2
(0.7) (1.2) (0.7) (0.9) (0.8)
Stoxx Europe 600 68.1*** 87.7*** 62.1*** 85.6*** 43.9***
(2.1) (3.7) (2.2) (2.9) (2.5)
Constant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Observations 260 260 260 260 260
R-squared 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6
Banks in sample 37 9 28 17 16
Note: The table shows the results (in percent) from the event study specication applied to Switzerlands commitment to
implement the automatic exchange of nancial account information (AEoI) at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting on 6
May 2014. Column (1) refers to all Swiss banks; Column (2) to Swiss banks that were subjected to criminal investigations
in the US for their role in o¤shore tax evasion; and Column (3) to Swiss banks that have admitted to criminal tax-related
o¤ences under the Swiss Bank Program. Column (4) includes only the Swiss banks that have paid penalties weakly above
the sample median; Column (5) includes only the Swiss banks that have paid penalties below the sample median. All
regressions include a set of event time dummies as described in the main text. Standard errors are provided in parentheses
and take account for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the abnormal returns. *** Signicant at the 1% level.
3.4 Results 77
The minimum e¤ects that would have been detected at a 5% signicance level with a
probability of 80% are therefore -1.7% for the entire sample of Swiss banks and -3.1% for
the Swiss banks under investigation.
For comparison, in a similar event study, Johannesen and Stolper (2017) assess the
abnormal stock price performance of Swiss banks after former employees of banks in tax
havens leaked information on the owners of secret o¤shore accounts to foreign tax au-
thorities or public media. Four days after the rst data leak of this kind, they estimate
abnormal drops in the stock prices of Swiss banks of -2.2% for the entire sample of Swiss
banks, and -6.1% for the Swiss banks under investigation in the US. Both estimates are
well above the MDE of this study.24 Rather than a lack of statistical power, the moder-
ately sized standard errors and the resulting minimum detectable e¤ect sizes indicate that
nancial markets expected Switzerlands commitment to the AEoI to have no sizeable
impact on the future prots of Swiss banks.
3.4.2 Further selected milestones toward the AEoI
One criticism on the analysis above is that the OECD declaration, including Switzerlands
commitment to the new standard of tax transparency, might not have been the one single
event indicating that Switzerland would participate in the AEoI. This section therefore
addresses further important milestones toward the new tax transparency standard.
Table 3.4 provides estimates from the same event study specication applied to further
events that are selected in Section 3.2.1 and listed in Table 3.1. To account for indica-
tions of the increasing international pressure on Switzerland and the countrys changing
attitude prior to the OECD declaration, the following events are considered: 10 April
2013, when Luxembourg announced the implementation of the AEoI with the EU by
2015 (Column 1); 21 April 2013, when for the rst time the G20 nance ministers and
central bank governors endorsed the AEoI as the expected new global standard (Column
2); 28 April 2013, when Austria announced its approval of the AEoI with the EU (Col-
umn 3); 14 June 2013, when Switzerland announced its willingness to contribute to the
development of, but not to participate in, the AEoI (Column 4); and 18 December 2013,
when Switzerland passed a mandate for negotiations on the AEoI with the EU (Column
5). For ease of comparison, Column (6) provides the results for 6 May 2014, the date of
main interest discussed previously, when Switzerland joined the OECD declaration com-
mitting to the AEoI. Moreover, to account for doubts as to whether or not Switzerland
would live up to its commitment, Column (7) refers to 27 May 2015, when Switzerland
signed the AEoI treaty with the EU, which substantiated its willingness to cooperate.
24The results of Johannesen and Stolper (2017) shall serve as an example of how the stock prices of Swiss banks can
react to important events concerning the Swiss banking secrecy. Note, however, that the e¤ects in both setups may di¤er
for several reasons. On the one hand, for example, a data leak is arguably more surprising than a political decision, and
may therefore cause stronger stock price reactions. On the other hand, data leaks typically a¤ected between some hundreds
and several thousands of bank customers from one nancial institution, whereas the AEoI is designed to systematically
reveal foreign account holders and should therefore be expected to cause a stronger increase in the level of tax compliance.
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TABLE 3.4: Regression results for further important milestones toward the AEoI
LUX G20 AUT OECD EU I Main EU II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAR 1 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3)
CAR 2 -0.1 -0.6 0.7 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
CAR 3 0.3 -0.5 1.5* 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
CAR 4 0.6 -0.6 1.8* -0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.7) (0.6) (0.7)
CAR 5 1.2 -0.3 1.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 1.0
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8)
Stoxx Europe 600 71.7*** 72.0*** 71.4*** 72.7*** 68.3*** 68.1*** 56.7***
(3.2) (3.2) (3.2) (3.0) (2.4) (2.1) (1.7)
Constant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R-squared 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Banks in sample 36 36 36 36 36 37 37
Note: The table shows the results (in percent) from the event study specication applied to important milestones toward
the automatic exchange of nancial account information (AEoI) that are considered particularly important. Column (1)
concerns when Luxembourg announced the implementation of the AEoI with the EU; Column (2) when the G20 countries
endorsed the AEoI as the expected new global standard; Column (3) when Austria announced the implementation of the
AEoI with the EU; Column (4) when Switzerland announced it would contribute to developing the new standard for the
AEoI; Column (5) when Switzerland agreed to negotiate on the AEoI with the EU; Column (6) when Switzerland committed
to implementing the AEoI; and Column (7) when Switzerland signed a treaty with the EU for the AEoI. Standard errors
are provided in parentheses and take account for cross-sectional and intertemporal correlation in the abnormal returns.
*** Signicant at the 1% level and * signicant at the 10% level.
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The results show that the stocks prices of Swiss banks generally experienced small ab-
normal returns in the days following the selected events. The largest cumulative abnormal
return in absolute terms and the only one that was temporarily statistically signicant
at the 10% level occurred after Austria committed to the AEoI, and was positive. The
largest negative cumulative abnormal returns occurred two and four days after the G20
countries endorsed the AEoI, and were as small as -0.6%. While some events were followed
by persistently negative or positive cumulative abnormal returns, over all selected events,
cumulative abnormal returns were neither systematically positive or negative. The results
do not suggest that any of the selected events had a sizeable or signicant impact on the
stock prices of Swiss banks.
3.4.3 An aggregated analysis of all front page articles
Finally, to validate that there was no other event that caused a strong and negative
cumulative abnormal return in the stock prices of Swiss banks and to justify the event
selection above, this section provides an aggregated analysis on (almost) every trading
day.
First, the analysis identies all three-day windows between January 2013 and October
2016 with no event concerning the AEoI as reected on the front page of NZZ. This yields
a set of 845 three-day event windows which reect normal times without important news
relating to the AEoI. The analysis then applies the previous event study specication
to estimate the cumulative abnormal return for each of these three-day windows. Figure
3.2a illustrates the cumulative distribution function of the resulting estimates.
Second, the analysis estimates the three-day cumulative abnormal returns after each
of the 44 NZZ front page articles mentioning the AEoI. This yields estimates for the
e¤ect of every event concerning the AEoI that was important enough to be reported on
the front page of NZZ. The cumulative distribution function of the resulting estimates is
illustrated in Figure 3.2b.
Cumulative abnormal returns during normal times in the absence of important news
regarding the AEoI, as illustrated in Figure 3.2a, appear to be distributed similarly to a
normal distribution with a mean close to zero. This suggests that the underlying event
study specication works well to account for normal returns, and that the parametric
tests above are meaningful.
Cumulative abnormal returns after events concerning the AEoI were reported on the
front page of NZZ, as illustrated in Figure 3.2b, seem to be distributed similarly. Most
cumulative abnormal returns lie between -0.6 and +0.6%. Only two negative cumulative
abnormal returns stand out: -3.0% upon 14 January 2015, and -1.0% upon 14 November
2013.
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FIGURE 3.2: Distributions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns
after and in the absence of important news concerning the AEoI
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(a) Three-day cumulative abnormal returns when the AEoI
was not mentioned on the front page of NZZ
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Cum
ula
tive
 dis
trib
utio
n fu
ncti
on
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
CAR 3
(b) Three-day cumulative abnormal returns after the AEoI was
mentioned on the front page of NZZ
Note: The gures illustrate the distributions of the cumulative abnormal returns of Swiss banks for (almost) all three-day
windows between January 2013 and October 2016 depending on whether or not the automatic exchange of nancial account
information (AEoI) was mentioned on the front page of Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). Figure (a) refers to all three-day
windows with no reference to the AEoI, and (b) to all three-day windows after the AEoI was mentioned on the front page
of NZZ.
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The remainder of this section addresses these two dates and applies the event study
specication to both dates individually. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The
gures depict the estimated cumulative abnormal returns in the stock prices of Swiss
banks as well as of the Swiss Market Index (SMI), a major index for the broad Swiss
stock market, around the two dates. As the event study specication controls for general
market conditions on the European level, the abnormal performance of the SMI indicates
changes of the conditions in the entire Swiss market relative to the European market. If
the abnormal drops in the stock prices of Swiss banks are indeed caused by the events
concerning the AEoI, this should have no strong e¤ects on the entire Swiss market and
the abnormal returns of the SMI should be close to zero.
Figure 3.3a illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns around 14 January 2015, when
the Swiss government submitted the draft law for the AEoI into the consultation process.
By coincidence, just one day later, the Swiss National Bank abandoned the exchange
rate cap of a minimum of 1.20 Swiss francs per euro. The strong abnormal drop in the
stock prices of Swiss banks of -3.0% occurred swiftly within two days, but started only
one day after the Swiss government submitted the draft law into consultation. The SMI
experienced a comparable drop of -2.3% at the very same time. The exact timing of the
stock price drop and its similarity to the abnormal performance of the SMI suggest that
the drop was caused by some event which happened one day after the submission of the
draft law and had implications for the entire Swiss market potentially the new exchange
rate regime by the Swiss National Bank.
Figure 3.3b illustrates the cumulative abnormal returns around 14 November 2013,
when Liechtenstein committed to the AEoI. In contrast to Austria and Luxembourg,
Liechtenstein is not a member country of the EU. Its commitment therefore had no im-
plications for the EU decision-making process and, in turn, for the Swiss banking secrecy.
In the week after Liechtensteins commitment, the stock prices of Swiss banks experi-
enced a gradual abnormal decline of around -0.3% per day, which very closely resembles
the abnormal performance of the SMI. Moreover, the abnormal decline in both return
series seemingly started at least two days prior to Liechtensteins commitment. Again,
the timing of the stock price decline and its similarity with the abnormal performance of
the SMI suggest that the decline was driven by unfavorable general market conditions in
Switzerland rather than the new tax transparency.25
25While I was not able to identify an obvious source for the stock price decline, a cumulative abnormal return of -1.0%
over four trading days does not seem to be very uncommon with around 8% of the cumulative abnormal returns during
normal times being smaller (see Tabel 3.2a).
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FIGURE 3.3: Most negative cumulative abnormal returns of Swiss banks
after important news concerning the AEoI
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(a) Cumulative abnormal returns around 14 January 2015
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(b) Cumulative abnormal returns around 14 November 2013
Note: The gures illustrate the cumulative abnormal returns of Swiss banks and the Swiss Market Index, a major index
for the Swiss stock market, around important news concerning the automatic exchange of nancial account information
(AEoI) upon which Swiss banks experienced strong abnormal drops in their stock prices. Figure (a) refers to 14 January
2015, when the Swiss government submitted the AEoI draft law into the consultation process and, by coincidence, one day
before the Swiss National Bank unpegged the Swiss franc from the xed exchange rate to the euro; and (b) refers to 14
November 2013, when Liechtenstein committed to the AEoI.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
Switzerland has undergone a radical change with regard to its banking secrecy. For
decades, the Swiss banking secrecy was commonly considered a reliable protection against
investigations by foreign tax authorities. This environment has attracted large amounts
of international wealth into Swiss banks. Zucman (2014, Table S.1) puts the foreign-
owned wealth in Switzerland by the end of 2013 at US $2.4 trillion. Although the level
of tax compliance among the owners of Swiss bank accounts has recently increased, it
remains low at around 20%. Swiss banks still prot from the service and transaction fees
from managing that wealth. As of 2018, Switzerland will participate in the international
exchange of nancial account information for tax purposes on an automatic basis.
This study examines how the new information exchange a¤ected the stock prices of
Swiss banks as an indicator of the banks future protability. It documents a modest
negative e¤ect which was limited to a small number of banks and is statistically not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. The minimum detectable e¤ect sizes in this study are
moderately sized and well below the estimated e¤ects in a similar event study on data
leaks from banks in tax havens (Johannesen and Stolper 2017). This suggests that the null
results are not a consequence of low statistical power, but rather that nancial markets
expected the new tax transparency to have no sizeable impact on the future prots of
Swiss banks.
While it is possible that previously tax non-compliant accounts will now become com-
pliant and remain with banks in Switzerland, it seems unlikely that a signicant increase
in the level of tax compliance among the customers of Swiss banks will have no e¤ect
on the banksfuture earnings. A more plausible explanation for the results seems to be
that the new tax transparency might not have signicantly increased the level of tax
compliance among the owners of Swiss bank accounts. In fact, media articles are already
reporting on loopholes in the new information exchange, which are said to attract large
amounts of capital and allow tax evaders to keep their assets with Swiss banks and still
remain anonymous to the tax authorities in their home countries.26
26One such loophole that is said to attract large amounts of capital is described in Financial transparency: The biggest
loophole of all, The Economist, 20 February 2016.
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Concluding remarks
Large amounts of the global private wealth are held in tax havens, where the majority of
it is believed to go untaxed. This dissertation addresses the optimal design of policies in
the ght against o¤shore tax evasion.
The rst chapter sheds light on the question of why haven countries comply with in-
ternational standards of transparency despite sizeable returns in the tax haven business.
Whether haven countries operate as a secretive tax haven or comply with transparency
standards is determined in a many-player coordination game between a haven country
and its many potential investors. This non-standard market for concealment services may
explain why the prots of tax havens are not competed away in international nancial
markets these prots make a haven country resilient against political pressure by the in-
ternational community and therefore trustworthy for tax evading investors. Furthermore,
the analysis points out a trade-o¤ between the ght against tax havens and a high level
of taxation, because high tax rates induce a strong incentive for taxpayers to engage in
evasion. A similar argument applies to weak penalties for revealed o¤shore tax evasion,
such as in voluntary disclosure programs.
The subsequent two chapters provide empirical evidence on the e¤ects of two recent
policy initiatives in the ght against o¤shore tax evasion. As tax evasion is inherently
di¢ cult to observe due to the concealment activities, the studies rely on an indirect
measure the stock prices of Swiss banks which are known to be involved in o¤shore tax
evasion.
The rst initiative under consideration are the acquisitions of stolen banking data from
tax havens by foreign tax authorities. The rst leak of this kind caused a signicant drop
in the stock prices of Swiss banks with a known link to o¤shore tax evasion. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that the leak might have reduced the hidden o¤shore
wealth in Switzerland by around 10%, most plausibly by increasing the perceived risk of
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involuntary exposure. This drop in the amount of o¤shore wealth in Swiss banks is also
supported in international investment statistics by the Bank for International Settlements
on foreign-owned bank deposits in all tax havens.
The second initiative is the automatic exchange of nancial account information for tax
purposes, which substantially weakened the Swiss banking secrecy for foreign investors.
Stock prices of Swiss banks showed no signicant or sizeable reactions to important news
concerning the new information exchange despite a high level of statistical power. The
results suggest that the automatic exchange of information might not have signicantly
increased the level of tax compliance among owners of o¤shore accounts.
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